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Between September 1970 and February 1972, a unique oppor-
tunity existed in the Middle East for the conclusion of an
interim settlement in the dispute between Egypt and Israel.
Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat declared his willingness
tc enter into a peace agreement with Israel and demonstrated
his sincerity by renewing the Rogers cease-fire plan, pro-
posing an interim Suez Canal agreement with Israel, and
opening a dialogue with the United States. Unfortunately,
the American foreign policy establishment failed to take
full advantage of the positive political, developments in
the Middle East , and a rare opportunity to move this troubled
region closer to peace was lost. This failure of American
diplomacy can be traced to the uncoordinated and ineffective
Middle East policy pursued in the three years separating
the Jordanian civil war of 1970 and the October 1973 Arab-
Israeli war. During this crucial period, U.S. Middle East
policy was formulated without an accurate understanding of
regional developments, was not impartial, was preoccupied
with the global ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
was not effectively conducted, was not coordinated between
the White House and the State Department, and, most important,
did not enjoy the full support and complete commitment of the
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This thesis originally began as an historical case
study tracing the evolution of U.S. -Egyptian relations from
1967 to 1974. The magnitude of such an effort, which can be
appreciated by glancing through the bibliography, soon became
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important lesson in objectivity when dealing with the emo-
tional issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Special recognition is in order for Mr. Roger Martin and
his staff of reference librarians at the Dudley Knox Library
at N.P.S. During the research phase of this project, they
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library loan. Through their diligent efforts, I received
everything that I requested and was able to complete this
thesis without wandering too far from the comfortable con-
fines of the Monterey Bay area. I must also recognize the
professional talents of my typist, Janet Butterfield, who
put the finishing touches on this large undertaking and
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somehow managed to preserve her sanity while distinguishing
between my "a Ml s and "o"'s.
Finally, I must acknowledge the steady encouragement
provided by my wife Julie and son Michael, who at the ripe
old age of three and a half has already learned that
writing a master's thesis is serious business. To my family,
who has experienced the pressures, tensions, and frustrations
of the past fifteen months, the completion of this project;




On February 4, 1971, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat
proposed an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel
whereby Israel would pull back its forces from the Suez
Canal and in return Egypt would clear and reopen the
canal. Sadat's proposal was the most significant diplomatic
development in the conflict between Egypt and Israel during
the period September 1970 to February 1972. Other develop-
ments included the prolonged cease-fire along the Suez
Canal, Sadat's expressed desire to make peace with Israel,
his growing suspicion of the Soviet Union, and his cautious
approach to the United States. In spite of these remarkable*
circumstances, American diplomacy failed to achieve either
an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel or the establish-
ment of a serious negotiating framework between the two
countries. This failure of U.S. Middle East policy can be
explained using the following nine reasons:
1) After their successful handling of the Jordanian
crisis in September 1970, President Richard M. Nixon and his
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, continued to view, as they had since taking
office in 1969, the Middle East situation as primarily a
global, instead of a regional, conflict. Israel was re-
garded as a strategic U.S. asset in the region, and it was
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believed that maintaining the military balance in Israel's
favor would deter the Egyptians from attacking Israel and
would convince the Egyptians that the large Soviet presence
in their country was of no political or military benefit.
Throughout 1971, the White House was consistently more
concerned with removing the Soviets from Egypt than with
launching a peace initiative.
(2) By concentrating on the global ramifications of the
Israeli-Egyptian conflict, the White House ignored several
regional developments, such as growing Arab frustrations,
especially among the Egyptians, Syrians, and Palestinians,
and increasing Arab political strength due largely to their
vast petroleum resources.
(3) Having controlled U.S. Middle"East policy during the
Jordanian crisis, the White House was reluctant to see the
State Department pursue an activist's role in the Middle
East. The White House gave the State Department very little
support for its initiatives during this period. The result
was that the State Department launched a series of ineffec-
tive, half-hearted initiatives that simply increased Arab
frustrations and reinforced Israeli intransigence.
(4) During the period under examination, crucial actions
were carried out by members of the American foreign policy
establishment's "second team," namely Secretary of State




the chief U.S. diplomat in Cairo, Donald Bergus,* and the
State Department's Egyptian-desk officer, Michael Sterner.
The abdication by Nixon and Kissinger of the leading role
in the search for a settlement was perhaps the major factor
behind the inability of American diplomacy to secure an
agreement, interim or otherwise. The White House was far
more concerned with the war in Vietnam, detente with the
Soviet Union, and normalizing relations with China. It
simply viewed the Middle East as a distraction and annoyance
Furthermore, Kissinger was reluctant to become directly
involved in the Middle East because he feared that he would
not be successful. Kissinger was content to wait until
Moscow favored a compromise solution or until the moderate
Arabs realized that the best route to a settlement was
through Washington.
(5) The United States misread Sadat's attitude toward
the Soviet Union. Whereas American policy makers feared
stronger political and military ties between the Soviet
Union and Egypt , especially in wake of the Treaty of Friend-
ship and Cooperation signed in May 1971, Sadat was very
suspicious of the Soviets and was less committed to them
than Nasser had been. Nevertheless, the Soviet presence
in Egypt prevented Nixon and Kissinger from seriously
Since Egypt severed diplomatic relations with the U.S.
following the June 1967 war, Bergus headed the U.S. Interest
Section located in the Spanish Embassy.
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considering the significance of Sadat's proposal for an
interim agreement
.
(6) The diplomacy carried out by the State Department
and, to a lesser extent, the White House was, in several
instances, very unprofessional. For example, notes and
messages from Sadat frequently went unanswered, Bergus
drafted a set of proposals by his own volition, and, worst
of all, Rogers and Sisco severely damaged their credibility
with both Egypt and Israel when they distorted Israeli
and Egyptian positions in order to make them appear more
attractive to the opposite party. This shoddy diplomacy
generated suspicion on behalf of both local parties and
resulted in a serious loss of confidence in the capabilities
of the United States.
(7) By the fall of 1971, Nixon was already concerned
with his reelection the following November. Therefore,
any serious U.S. peace initiative would be delayed for at
least another year. This circumstance greatly contributed
to the growing frustrations of the Arabs, especially Sadat.
(8) By early 1972, the United States had destroyed its
image as an impartial mediator to the Israeli-Egyptian dis-
pute. Rogers's October 1971 proposal for an interim agreement
was soundly rejected by Israel as being pro-Arab. Conversely,
Egypt cited the memoranda of understanding and the arms
agreements between the U.S. and Israel as proof that the U.S.
position was aligned almost completely with that of Israel's.
14

(9) Throughout this period, the United States refused
to withhold military supplies from Israel as a means of
forcing the Israelis to make concessions. Furthermore,
U.S. arms sales increased dramatically and Israel obtained
several political understandings with the U.S. on Middle
East policy. Sadat had hoped that the U.S. would exploit
its unique relationship with Israel in the interest of
achieving an interim settlement. The closer U.S. -Israeli
bond only served to drive Sadat further away from a peace-
ful course.
The explanations described above can be summarized in
the following statement, which serves as the premise of this
thesis: Since U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Egyptian
dispute during the period September 1970 to February 1972
was formulated without an accurate understanding of regional
developments, was not impartial, was preoccupied with the
global ramifications of the conflict, was not effectively
conducted, and did not enjoy the full support and complete
commitment of the President of the United States, an
interim agreement or at least a serious negotiating frame-
work between Egypt and Israel was not achieved and the
October 1973 Middle East war was not prevented.
This thesis will take the form of an historical case
study which will examine and analyze a very crucial period
in the history of American policy toward the Arab-Israeli
conflict. As a case study, the historical evidence, which
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has been obtained from speeches, public documents, news-
paper articles, interviews, memoirs, and first hand accounts,
will be presented in a detailed chronological description.
It must be emphasized, however, that the main focus of
this study will be on the causes behind the failure of
American diplomacy. The events and circumstances, which




II- BACKGROUND: THE AFTERMATH OF THE JORDANIAN CRIS IS
In September 1970, a full scale civil war erupted in
Jordan. King Hussein, a moderate Arab and close friend of
the United States, came under attack by the militant Pales-
tinian fedayeen, who believed that Hussein was prepared to
join President Nasser of Egypt in the latest Rogers initia-
tive,* which the Palestinians believed betrayed their
struggle against Israel. William B. Quandt points out
*0n June 25, 1970, Rogers announced a new "political
initiative, the objective of which is to encourage the
parties to stop shooting and start talking under the
auspices of Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the
resolution of the Security Council.'' [Ref. 1: p. 26]
Specifically, the plan called for a ninety day cease-fire
between Egypt and Israel, who had been engaged in the so-
called "war of attrition" since March 1969, and renewed
discussions under Jarring' s auspices. Egypt accepted the
plan on July 22; Israel accepted on August 6. The cease-
fire along the Suez Canal went into effect on August 7.
Dr. Gunnar Jarring of Sweden was appointed by U.N.
Secretary-General U Thant to work with the local parties
to implement the provisions of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242, passed November 22, 1967. Since 1968,
Ambassador Jarring 's mission had met with virtually no
success. Furthermore, discussions under his auspices
between the Arabs and Israelis had not yet taken place.
Resolution 242 (see Appendix A), a purposely ambiguous
document, called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and
"termination of all claims of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial inte-
grity, and political independence of every state in the
area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."
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that by the time the fighting in Jordan ended on September
27, it was apparent that the common strategy, worked out
between the United States and Israel, had scored a series
of major political and military victories: King Hussein
was firmly in power; the fedayeen were routed; and "the
Soviet Union was forced to back down, reining in its Syrian
clients under U.S. -Israeli pressure." [Ref. 2: p. 106]
Although neither the United States nor Israel became
militarily involved in the Jordanian civil war, it was
widely believed in American policy making circles, especially
at the White House, that Israel's threat of intervention
on behalf of King Hussein and the strong American-Israeli
support for Hussein's counterattacks against the fedayeen
and Syrians were the key elements behind the* successful
outcome of the crisis.
It will be shown in the following paragraphs that
American Middle East policy suffered in the long run as a
result of its outward success in the Jordanian civil war.
Out of the crisis of September 1970 would emerge several
misperceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These mis-
perceptions and the resulting policies would hamper American
efforts to deal effectively and realistically with the
crisis for the next three years.
A. THE WHITE HOUSE VIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
A principal component of Nixon's foreign policy was
his concern over the maintenance of the global balance of
18

power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nixon
and Kissinger viewed developments in the Middle East almost
exclusively in terms of their relationship to the competi-
tion between the two superpowers. This preoccupation with the
international ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict was
enhanced by the belief that American resolve and visible
strength had forced the Soviets to restrain the actions of
the Syrians during the Jordanian civil war. In the three
years separating the Jordanian crisis and the October 1973
war, American Middle East policy would become obsessed with
the removal of the Soviets from Egypt and with the notion
that a strong and secure Israel would promote regional
stability and deter hostilities.
Quandt contends that Nixon and Kissinger virtually
abandoned all interest in understanding the significance
of local developments in the Middle East. [Ref. 2:
pp. 126-27] Quandt states:
Too little attention was paid (by the White House)
to political developments in the region, to the mounting
frustrations in Egypt and Syria and among the Pales-
tinians, and to the growing activism of the Arabs, who
had begun to recognize the potential power they possessed
because of their petroleum resources ... .The global
dimension of the conflict was virtually all that Nixon
and Kissinger seemed to care about. By ignoring regional
trends, they misjudged the very forces that would
lead within three years to a much more dangerous out-
break of war in October 1973. [Ref. 2: pp. 126-27]
B. THE JORDANIAN CRISIS AND U.S. -ISRAELI RELATIONS
Bernard Reich [Ref. 3: pp. 214-15 (note 50)] contends
that during the Jordanian civil war Israel was prepared,
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with the full backing of the United States, to launch air
and ground attacks against the Syrian armored columns,
which had entered Jordan, in order to save the moderate
regime of King Hussein. This close cooperation between the
United States and Israel during the crisis demonstrated to
Nixon and Kissinger the apparent value of Israel as both a
partner and a strategic asset in the region.
Although relations between the United States and Israel
had become extremely bitter due to disagreements over
alleged Egyptian violations of the August cease-fire agree-
ment, the ties between the two countries reached an unpre-
cedented apogee following the Jordanian crisis. According
to Quandt , the White House subscribed to the view that
a well armed Israel would deter an Egyptian attack in the
Sinai and thus contribute to both the decline of Soviet
influence in Egypt and the protection of American interests
in the region. Increased arms sales to Israel were justified
by utilizing the strategic ally argument. [Ref. 2: pp.
121-22]
The State Department's view of the Arab-Israeli conflict
was not altered by the recent crisis in Jordan. Quandt
points out that the policy makers at Foggy Bottom continued
to advocate an "evenhanded" Middle East policy as the best
means of protecting American interests in the area. [Ref. 2:
p. 120] Furthermore, the State Department warned that a
strategic relationship between the U.S. and Israel, which
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would include vast amounts of economic and military aid,
would further damage U.S. -Arab relations, would not reduce
the likelihood of renewed hostilities, and would provide
the Soviets with an obvious incentive for increasing their
influence in the region.
C. THE WHITE HOUSE TAKES CONTROL OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY
During the first eighteen months of the Nixon Adminis-
tration, the State Department was charged with the primary
responsibility for the development and implementation of
U.S. policy in the Middle East. During the Jordanian civil
war, the management of the crisis was assumed almost com-
pletely by Nixon and Kissinger. Following the resolution
of the crisis, the White House was ready to return its
attention to the following foreign policy issues: the
Vietnam war, detente with the Soviet Union, and the secret
negotiations with China. However, having gained control of
U.S. Middle East policy as a result of the crisis, the White
House was reluctant to give it up.
According to Quandt , the Nixon-Kissinger perspective
of the Middle East situation would become a more dominant
factor in the development and conduct of American policy
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The global aspects of the
conflict and the strategic relationship with Israel would
be emphasized. Of great significance to this study is the
fact that the White House charged the State Department with
the daily supervision of Middle East diplomacy yet was
21

determined to prevent the latter from exercising "excessive
activism" in this area. [Ref. 2: p. 128] Nixon and Kissin-
ger dreaded either an outbreak of hostilities or their
involvement with a protracted diplomatic initiative. Either
situation would distract them from the pursuit of their
primary foreign policy concerns . It will be seen that during
1971, Sadat's "year of decision," the State Department's
efforts at achieving an interim settlement were doomed to
fail because of the lack of support and the absence of
commitment on the part of the White House.
D. SHAPING A POST-CRISIS MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY
Although Kissinger was determined to avoid direct in-
volvement in the conduct of Middle East policy, he did
possess a clear set of ideas on America's diplomatic role
in the region. Writing in the second volume of his memoirs,
Years of Upheaval
,
Kissinger outlined the following set of
guidelines. First, the United States should not impose a
settlement on Israel. An imposed settlement would be inter-
preted as a victory for the Soviets and the maximum Arab
program and would indicate that the United States was sus-
ceptible to extortion. Second, a principal goal of American
Middle East policy should be to strengthen the position of
the moderate Arabs as against the radicals* who are
*Mark W. Zacher in his authoritative work, International
Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77 (Praeger, 1977,
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supported by the Soviet Union. Third, the United States
should not cooperate with the Soviet Union on the pursuit of
a settlement so long as their policy was aligned with the
position of the radical Arabs. [Ref. 4: pp. 201-03]
In Years of Upheaval
,
Kissinger summarizes his Middle
East strategy:
Sooner or later, I was convinced, either Egypt or some
other (Arab) state would recognize that reliance on
Soviet support and radical rhetoric guaranteed the
frustration of its aspirations. At that point, it might
be willing to eliminate the Soviet military presence .. .and
to consider attainable rather than Utopian goals. Then
(sic) would come the moment for a major American initia-
tive, if necessary using new approaches on our Israeli
friends. [Ref. 4: p. 202]




My aim was to produce a (diplomatic) stalemate until
Moscow urged compromise or until, even better, some
moderate Arab 'regime decided that the route to progress
was through Washington. [Ref. 5: p. 1279]
At the urging of State Department officials, a more
immediate and pragmatic Middle East policy was adopted.
According to Quandt , it was decided that Secretary of
p. 169), assigns the nations of the Arab world to one of
the following two categories for the period 1971-72:
Rejectionists (Radicals) : Algeria, Iraq, Libya, South
Yemen, and Syria.
Accommodationists (Moderates) : Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.E., and Yemen.




State Rogers with Nixon's limited endorsement would pursue
a two-stage policy. First, the United States would
reach an understanding with Israel on such matters as Ameri-
can military sales and the terms of reference for Arab-Israeli
negotiations under U.N. representative Dr. Gunnar Jarring.
Second, the United States would encourage Jarring to
vigorously pursue all possible efforts to obtain from the
local parties a set of principles for a peace settlement.
To assist Jarring, the U.S. would conduct bilateral talks
with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Rogers and other American
policy makers hoped that Jarring would be able to obtain
agreement on the principle of an Israeli withdrawal from
the occupied Arab territories in return for Arab commit-
ments to peace. [Ref. 2: p. 131]
E . SUMMARY
The apparent success of U.S. and Israeli policies during
the Jordanian civil war served in effect to freeze the
diplomatic situation in the Middle East. For the next
three years Nixon and Kissinger gave lip service to the
idea of a settlement between Egypt and Israel but they were
far more concerned with the maintenance of the status quo in
the region. Furthermore, they firmly believed that the out-
break of hostilities was remote so long as Israel retained
control of vast tracts of Arab land and was kept well




In order to maintain the status quo, it was essential
that the White House retain ultimate control over Middle
East policy. In large part, this meant preventing the
State Department from advancing too far toward a settlement.
Success by the State Department was precluded by the
fact that only the White House could exert pressure on
Israel to make concessions and this it was unwilling to
do. Therefore, the efforts of Rogers and Sisco were not
only bound to fail but were guaranteed to generate Arab
frustration and Israeli intransigence.
With regard to post-crisis American Middle East policy,
the most significant consequence of the Jordanian civil
war was that it reaffirmed the White House view of the
Arab-Israeli conflict in international, instead of regional,
terms. For instance, Kissinger was content to wait for an
indefinite period for the removal of the Soviets from Egypt.
Only then would he try his hand at Middle East diplomacy.
Such an outlook ignored current regional developments,
such as Arab talk of the oil weapon and Arab determination
to recover their lost territories and to obtain the recogni-
tion of Palestinian national rights. If this outlook did not
ignore them, then it regarded them as unimportant. Contrary
to the White House view of the Middle East situation, the
region was indeed in ferment in the three years between the
Jordanian civil war and the October war. A concerted American
Middle East policy, which enjoyed the backing of the White
25

House and made a serious attempt to deal with the powerful
forces in the Arab world, may have prevented the disastrous
war of October 1973. Unfortunately, no American policy
of this kind was forthcoming.
26

HI- THE UNITED STATES, THE LOCAL PARTIES, AND
THE JARRING TALKS ~~
The last three months of 1970 comprise the first section
of this case study. During this period, the United States
was largely preoccupied with finding a means to convince
Israel to join the Jarring talks in light of the serious
Egyptian violations of the August cease-fire agreement.
The necessary formula turned out to be a series of agree-
ments between the United States and Israel concerning arms
sales and diplomatic commitments.
Adding to the already complex situation in the Middle
East was the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the
emergence of his successor, Anwar el-Sadat, a political
unknown. Whereas Sadat's initial contacts with the U.S.
revealed an earnest desire for peace, American policy makers
were content to take their time sizing him up before making
any formal commitments to him. Nevertheless, Sadat sur-
prised observers in the U.S. and Israel when he renewed
the August cease-fire agreement for another three months.
A. THE DEATH OF NASSER
On September 28, the day after he successfully negotiated
the cease-fire which ended the Jordanian civil war, Presi-




His death reopened such issues as the Soviet role in
Egypt and in the Middle East, the status of the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the June initiative, and the
future of U.S. Middle East policy based on Nasser's
special position in Egypt and the Arab world. [Ref. 3:
p. 172].
American officials were especially concerned with the future
of Egypt's participation in the latest Rogers initiative
which Nasser had accepted. In an interview on October 11,
Secretary Rogers expressed the hope that Nasser's successor,
Anwar el-Sadat, "would follow the same policy and seek a
peaceful settlement." [Ref. 6: p. 546]
To American policy makers, Reich adds, Sadat was an
unknown political entity,. Although his views toward the
peace process and the Soviet Union were not completely known,
it was assumed that he would continue Nasser's policies
for the most part and would not undermine either the cease-
fire or the Jarring mission. [Ref. 3: p. 172] In his auto-
biography, Sadat states that he favored Rogers's June 1970
initiative and, by the time Nasser died, was dedicated to
the pursuit of peace. [Ref. 7: p. 276] He recalls the
conversation he had with Under Secretary of State Elliot
Richardson following Nasser's funeral:
I'd like you to know this... and to convey it to the
American President: I was against the Rogers Plan
and had in fact rejected it. I accepted it only after
Abdel Nasser .. .explained. . .the circumstances ... .All I
want is peace. Let us work together for peace. I am
today committed to the Rogers Plan.... Once again let me
call on you to work for peace. I am prepared to go to
any lengths to achieve it. [Ref. 7: p. 276]
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Sadat's avowal of peace and his appeal for diplomatic support
from the United States apparently fell on deaf ears. The
Americans did not respond.
B. THE OCTOBER 1970 U.S. -ISRAELI ARMS DEAL
The first problem facing American Middle East policy
makers in the wake of the Jordanian crisis and the death of
Nasser was finding a formula whereby Israel could participate
confidently in the Jarring talks. Israel had refused to
meet with Jarring since August 25 because it contended
that Egypt had blatantly violated the August 7 cease-fire
agreement by moving Soviet SA-2 and SA-3 surface to air
missiles into the standstill zone (within fifty kilometers
of the Suez Canal). [Ref. 8: p. 457] According to then
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban , the Israelis soon
realized that a pull back of the Soviet missiles, which they
initially demanded, would be virtually impossible to obtain.
In light of this, Eban adds, the United States attempted
to restore Israel's confidence in both the cease-fire and
the Jarring talks by rectifying the military imbalance
along the canal. [Ref. 9: p. 474] According to Quandt
,
Nixon approved on October 15 an arms sale worth ninety
million dollars [Ref. 2: p. 131] According to The New York
Times, the package included modern tanks, reconnaissance
aircraft, long-range artillery, ECM equipment, air-to-
ground missiles, and miscellaneous minor equipment.
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Furthermore, Nixon announced he would seek from Congress a
$500 million military credit for Israel. [Ref. 10: p. 1]
In a speech before the Knesset on November 16, Mrs.
Meir conceded that it would be very difficult to achieve a
roll back of the missiles to their pre-August 7 position.
Furthermore, she left no doubt that Israel would return to
the -Jarring talks, provided it was under the proper condi-
tions. [Ref. 11: pp. 1,8] According to Reich, it was
apparent during the fall of 1970 that Israel gradually altered
the conditions necessary for its participation in the Jarring
talks. Israel soon dropped its demand for a removal of the
missiles and concentrated its effots on obtaining American
political assurances and arms agreements which would keep
the military balance along the Suez Canal in its favor.
•[Ref. 3: p. 174]
C. SADAT EXTENDS THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
Undaunted by the recent American decision to sell arms
to Israel, Sadat announced in early November that he would
extend the cease-fire for another three months. During the
next ninety day period, Sadat was hopeful that Israel would
join the Jarring talks and substantial progress would be
made toward a settlement. [Ref. 7: p. 277]
D. ISRAEL SEEKS ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES
In a letter to President Nixon on December 1, Prime
Minister Meir requested a series of diplomatic and military
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assurances from the United States as a precondition for its
participation in the Jarring talks. According to The New
York Times
,
Mrs. Meir sought the following commitments from
the U.S.: that the United States would seek an extention of
the 90 day cease-fire even if the Jarring talks collapse; that
the U.S. would not withhold arms shipments as a means of
pressuring Israel into making concessions; that the U.S.
would drop its call for a complete Israeli withdrawal from
occupied territories as part of a Middle East agreement; that
the U.S. would veto any U.N. Security Council resolution
which is anti-Israeli; and that the U.S. would conclude a
long-term arms agreement with Israel. [Ref. 12 and Ref. 13]
On December 3, Nixon responded to Mrs. Meir's request
with general assurances of military and diplomatic support.
Nixon promised that the United States would not allow
Israel to be placed in a position of disadvantage during
the Jarring talks. He did not respond, however, to the
proposal for a long-term arms agreement. [Ref. 13]
On December 6, Mrs. Meir informed her Cabinet that
she was not satisfied with Nixon's assurances of December 3.
She added that further clarifications regarding American
commitments would be required before Israel would consent
to the Jarring talks. [Ref. 13] Furthermore, that same day,
the Israeli Cabinet decided to call upon the United States
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to modify or abandon the December 1969 Rogers Plan* which
called on Israel to withdraw from all but "insubstantial"
portions of the occupied Arab territories. [Ref. 14]
As part of the clarification process mentioned by Mrs.
Meir, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan arrived in
Washington in mid-December for a series of meetings with
senior U.S. officials. According to Reich, the American
officials, which included Nixon, Rogers, and Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird, pressed Israel to join the Jarring
negotiations as soon as possible. Dayan was reportedly
satisfied with the U.S. pledge that the current arms ship-
ments to Israel would continue and that future shipments
would not be dependent upon a favorable Israeli attitude
toward the Jarring talks. [Ref. 3: p. 175]
On December 17, in a letter to Mrs. Meir, Nixon attempted
to address the Israeli Prime Minister's plea for further
clarifications. According to Tad Szulc, Nixon reportedly
stated that the U.S. could not make a formal pledge concerning
the use of its veto in the Security Council. [Ref. 15]
According to Quandt , he did promise, however, that Israel's
national security would not be allowed to reach a dangerous
state. As a sign that his pledge was genuine, Nixon




Skyhawks during the first half of 1971. [Ref. 2: p. 132]
According to The Washington Post , Nixon indicated that the
Rogers Plan of December 1969 "is not a rigid framework and
that the United States does not intend to impose it on
either side in the Jarring talks." [Ref. 16: p. A13]
Finally, Szulc reports that Nixon reaffirmed American
support for a contractural settlement agreed to by the
local parties themselves. [Ref. 15]
It must be noted that Nixon's assurances of December
17 stopped short of an open-ended U.S. commitment to a steady
flow of military and economic aid to Israel. The United
States retained the right to make decisions concerning
military sales on an individual case basis.
E. ISRAEL AGREES TO JOIN JARRING TALKS
1 . Mrs. Meir's December 29 Knesset Speech
Nixon's letter apparently satisfied the Israeli
demand for clarification of American diplomatic and military
commitments. On December 28, the Israeli cabinet decided
to return to the negotiations with Egypt and Jordan under
the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. [Ref. 3: p. 177] In
a speech before the Knesset the following day, Mrs. Meir
emphasized her strong belief that Israel would be able to
negotiate without pressure or interference from the United
States. She stated:
We have grounds for assuming that the United States
Government will not be a party to the determination,
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by the Security Council, of solutions pertaining to
territorial issues, the refugee problem and other sub-jects, the solution to which are a matter for negotia-
tion and agreement between the parties. [Ref. 15]
2. Sadat's Reaction to Mrs. Meir's Speech
Sadat revealed in his autobiography that he v/as
extremely disappointed by the content of Mrs. Meir's Decem-
ber 29 Knesset speech. He believed that Israeli influence
had forced the United States to retreat from its earlier
position on Israeli withdrawal which had been outlined by
Rogers in December 1969. [Ref. 7: p. 286] At this very
early stage in his Presidency, Sadat realized perhaps that
if there was to be significant movement toward peace he
would have to cause it himself.
F. NIXON-SADAT CORRESPONDENCE
While Nixon and the State Department were dealing with
the problem of Israel's participation in the Jarring nego-
tiations, a series of letters and messages was exchanged
between Nixon and Sadat . According to Quandt , Nixon received
on December 14 a letter from Sadat dated November 23. In
the letter, Sadat confirmed Egypt's desire to participate in
the Jarring talks. [Ref. 2: p. 133] On December 22, Nixon
responded through Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fawzi. All
that is known about Nixon's message is that it contained his
sincere thanks to Egypt for sending a representative to
President Eisenhower's funeral, an event which had occurred
twenty-one months earlier. [Ref. 7: p. 277]
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On December 24, Sadat wrote Nixon a letter in which he
reviewed U. S . -Egyptian relations since October 1970 and
emphasized his nation's independence vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. The Egyptian President wrote:
To begin with, I had sent you a message with
Ambassador (Elliot) Richardson who visited Egypt to
offer condolences on Nasser's death, but you never
replied to it. You have, meanwhile, supported Israel's
claim that Egypt violated the terms of the (June 1970)
Rogers Plan although you know very well that the terri-
tory east and west of the Canal is Egyptian.
Now... I am writing to you to confirm the contents
of the message I sent you with Ambassador Richardson
and to add a few things. You would be mistaken to think
that we are in the sphere of Soviet influence: we are
not within the Soviet sphere of influence nor, for that
matter, anybody's sphere of influence. I'd like you to
know, furthermore, that nobody could claim to be
Egypt's tutelar power. So, if you wish to talk about
anything concerning Egypt, the venue will be Cairo and
the talks v/ill be with me, not with any other party.
[Ref. 7: p. 278]
Two days later, Sadat received Nixon's reply. Nixon
affirmed his desire to maintain a cordial relationship
between the two countries. Furthermore, he acknowledged
Sadat's assertion that his will was independent and free
from foreign influences. [Ref. 7: p. 278]
Sadat's firm statement outlining his relationship with
the Soviet Union caused policy makers in Washington to hold
Sadat in a more favorable light. Although it was unclear
at the end of 1970 what future Egyptian politics would hold
for Anwar el-Sadat, it was clear that a new political entity
or, possibly, era was emerging in Cairo. Writing about Sadat
at this stage in his Presidency, the famed Egyptian journalist
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Mohammad Heikal asserts that Sadat enjoyed a great deal
more freedom than Nasser with regard to the Soviet Union.
According to Heikal,
Sadat was an unknown quantity: he did... have a greater
freedom to look to the West. The Russians knew this
and so they knew that they would have to work to build
a new relationship with Nasser's successor while at
the same time harbouring deeD uncertainties about him.
[Ref. 17: p. 118]
G . SUMMARY
Some of the actions taken and attitudes adopted by the
United States during this period served as a precursor of
similar American policies and decisions which would emerge
in the succeeding fourteen months. For instance, although
Nixon's decision to increase arms shipments and make politi-
cal commitments to Israel could be justified in view of the
placement of modern Soviet missiles near the Suez Canal , it
established a significant precedent for relations between
the U.S. and Israel. Henceforth, in order to bring Israel
into negotiations, the United States would have to react
favorably to Israel's assertion that its military posture
had deteriorated and that it did not feel confident enough
to undertake discussions with its neighbors. By redressing
the military balance along the Suez Canal, which was already
overwhelmingly in Israel's favor, the United States further
alienated several Arab nations, particularly the confronta-
tion states, and left Israel in a position where is was more
independent of directives from the U.S. and even less willing
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to negotiate with the aim of reaching a settlement. The
idea of withholding arms from Israel as a means to force it
to the negotiating ^able was out of the question in the
aftermath of the successful handling by the U.S. and Israel
of the Jordan inn crisis.
Concerning its initial relations with Sadat, the United
Stare.", adopted an incredibly low-key approach, perhaps
becau: e several American officials, including Kissinger,
regarded Sadat as an interim president until Nasser's
actual successor emerged. By assuming that Sadat's term in
office would be brief, American policy makers ignored the
significance of his decision to renew the cease-fire and
made very little effort to assertain his views toward such
issues as peace with Israel and relations with the supei
powers. Furthermore, there was no logical excuse for the
allure of the United States to respond to Sadat's verbal
r- ssage conveyed through Under Secretary Richardson. In










IV. SADAT'S SUEZ CANAL PROPOSAL AND THE
COLLAPSE OF THE JARRING TALKS
The first two months of 1971 witnessed a remarkable
burst of diplomatic activity on the part of Israel, Egypt,
and U.N. representative Jarring. Egypt and Israel appeared
eager to work with Ambassador Jarring and even exchanged
position papers related to a Middle East settlement on two
separate occasions. Jarring was unable, however, to bridge
their differences on two critical issues: the location of
the final borders and the nature of the peace agreement.
Jarring's mission soon collapsed, perhaps too easily, after
three years of frustrating effort that produced no tangible
progress toward the implementation of any portion of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242.
In early February, Sadat unveiled a new strategy which
he hoped would generate significant progress toward a com-
prehensive settlement with Israel and would demonstrate to
the world community his sincere desire for peace. Sadat
called for a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
east bank of the Suez Canal followed by the clearing and
reopening of the canal by the Egyptians. Furthermore,
Sadat stipulated that this interim-agreement must be firmly
linked to the full implementation of Resolution 242. Al-
though Sadat's initiative generated little interest at the
White House and limited enthusiasm in Jerusalem, it
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immediately eclipsed the Jarring mission in importance and
soon led to the State Department's direct involvement in the
search for a settlement between Egypt and Israel.
A. JARRING RESUMES HIS MIDDLE EAST MISSION
1
•
Jarring Receives an Israeli Proposal
On January 5 , 1971 , Ambassador Jarring resumed at
the U.N. his discussions on the Middle East. Responding
to an invitation from the Meir government, Jarring visited
Jerusalem from 8 to 10 January. While in Israel he met
with Mrs. Meir and Foreign Minister Abba Eban . [Ref. 3:
p. 177] The Israeli officials presented Jarring with a
detailed memorandum, which outlined their positions con-
cerning a settlement with Egypt. According to the Paris
weekly Jeune Afrique
,
which had obtained a copy of the
memorandum, the Israeli paper contained the following
twelve points:
1. A proclaimed and explicit decision to consider
the conflict as finally terminated,
2. Respect and recognition by each of the parties
concerned, in explicit terms, of the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and political independence of the other,
3. Establishment of secure, recognized and agreed
frontiers
,
4. Other additional arrangements to insure security,
5. Withdrawal of military forces from territories
lying beyond positions agreed in the peace treaty,
6. An end of the state of war and of hostilities,
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7. Responsibility assumed by each of the parties to
ensure that no act of war or violence is perpetrated from
or on its territory by any group, organization or indivi-
dual against the population, citizens or property of the
other party,
8. Ending of economic warfare in all its manifesta-
tions, including boycotting,
9. Clauses detailing the undertakings entered into
by the parties to the agreement for the settlement of the
refugee problem, . .
.
10. Non-participation in hostile alliances and each
of the parties to be prohibited from stationing troops
in third countries or maintaining a state of belligerence
with the other parties,
11. Non-intervention in internal affiars and normal
external relations,
12. Peace must be established in a treaty binding the
parties in accordance with normal legislation and custom.
[Ref. 18: p. 75]
2 . The Egyptian Response to the Israeli Memorandum
Back at the U.N., Jarring received on January 15 a
six-point memorandum from Egyptian Ambassador Mohammad Hassan
el-Zayyat. The memorandum, which contained the official
Egyptian counterproposal for a Middle East settlement, was
made public by Zayyat on January 20. [Ref. 18: p. 75] The
following is the text of the Egyptian memorandum:
In order that the United Nations 22 November 1967
Security Council resolution be fully implemented, it is
necessary that
:
1. The Israeli agression be terminated and the
Israeli armed forces be withdrawn beyond the June 5,
1967, lines, as provided for in Security Council re-
solution 242 ....
2. Israel declare its repudiation of the policy of
territorial expansion which it has pursued at the
expense of the neighbouring Arab states.
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3. A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must
be reached. This can only be realized through Israel's
respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in
accordance with the UN resolutions.
4. The termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in
waterways
.
5. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereign-
ty, territorial integrity and political independence of
every state in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force.
6. Guaranteeing of peace and the territorial in-
violability and political independence of every state in
the area.
The Security Council may decide upon the necessary
arrangements which would provide security to all states
in the area. These arrangements may, inter alia
,
include
A. The establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in
which the four permanent members of the Security Council
would participate.
B. The establishment of demilitarized zones astride
the borders. [Ref. 18: p. 75]
According to the Los Angeles Times
,
the contents of the
memorandum were softened by Jarring prior to its release.
Sources at the U.N. also confirmed that Egypt was "talking
to Israel more quietly in private than in public." Through-
out January, an air of optimism swirled through the United
Nations. [Ref. 18: p. 75] Many diplomats, including U.N.
Secretary-General U Thant , believed that a Middle East
settlement was no longer a remote possibility. [Ref. 3:
p. 177] Ambassador Jarring was scheduled to make a tour
of Middle East capitals the following month. He would
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have to work quickly because the first extension of the cease-
fire was due to expire on February 5.
B. THE ROGERS-RIAD CORRESPONDENCE
In early January, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad
contacted Secretary Rogers and requested information con-
cerning the nature of the U.S. involvement, if any, in the
intensified Jarring negotiations. According to Quandt
,
Riad was curious to know ''what role the United States was
prepared to play and what type of settlement it envisaged."
[Ref. 2: p. 134] The Egyptians hoped that the United
States would play a more active part in the settlement process
and would exert pressure on Israel to withdraw from the
occupied territories.
*
During the course of January, Rogers dispatched three
messages to Riad. In the first message, Rogers appealed to
Cairo to extend the cease-fire and avoid a confrontation in
the Security Council, which would inevitably destroy the
cordiality which surrounded the Jarring talks during most of
the month. In the second note, Rogers emphasized his
belief that the positions of Egypt and Israel had narrowed
sufficiently to make progress in the negotiations possible.
[Ref. 19] Furthermore, according to Newsweek , Rogers re-
iterated his view, outlined publicly in December 1969, "that
Israel should withdraw from all but 'insubstantial' portions
of the occupied territory." Rogers also promised "an all-
out effort to help the parties reach a settlement this year."
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[Ref. 20: p. 37] In the final note, Newsweek reports,
Rogers indicated that Israel would offer new "substantive
ideas" as soon as the cease-fire is extended along the
Suez Canal. [Ref. 20: p. 37]
C. SADAT'S SUEZ CANAL INITIATIVE
1. The Jarring Talks Deadlock
By the end of January, the negotiations under Jarring'
s
auspices at the U.N. unfortunately reached a state of total
impasse. The Egyptians insisted that the Israelis give
concrete examples of what they meant by agreed upon final
borders. On the other hand, the Israelis demanded that the
Egyptians specify the kind of peace agreement they would be
willing to sign. [Ref. 19]
In the Egyptian view, the negotiations were hope-
lessly deadlocked. They threatened publicly to liberate
the Sinai by force when the cease-fire expired unless Israel
immediately declared its intention to withdraw from all
occupied territories. For a few days at the beginning of
February, the Middle East appeared on the brink of war.
[Ref. 20: p. 37] The tense situation was soon defused,
however, by an unexpected initiative put forward by President
Sadat
.
2 Details of the Canal Proposal
In early 1971, Anwar el-Sadat was trapped in a very
frustrating dilemma. He realized that his armed forces were
not yet ready to attack Israel, but his adherence to an
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indefinite cease-fire would severely weaken his standing
both at home and in the Arab world. To buy time for his
armed forces and strengthen his political base, Sadat designed
a strategy, as Newsweek puts it, whereby he "softened his
stand and began demanding only 'substantial progress' from the
(Jarring) talks as a prize for keeping his hand off the
trigger." [Ref. 20: p. 37]
In a speech before the Egyptian National Assembly on
February 4, Sadat outlined his peace initiative. His proposal
contained the following points:
(a) The UAR considers itself bound by one commit-
ment for which there can be no alternative: the
liberation of all territories occupied during the
1967 aggression....
(b) Despite this primary major commitment, we
accept the appeal of the U.N. Secretary-General
and decide to refrain from opening fire for a period which
we cannot extend beyond 30 days ending on March 7.
During this period, the Secretary-General and the entire
world community must ensure that there is genuine progress
regarding the heart of the problem and not in its out-
ward manifestation. . .
.
(c) ...We demand that during the period when we
refrain from opening fire that a partial withdrawal of
the Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal
be achieved as the first stage of a timetable which will
be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the
Security Council resolution. If it is to be achieved
within this period, we shall be prepared to begin
immediately to clear the Suez Canal and reopen it to
international navigation to serve the world economy.
[Ref. 21: p. 34]
In his autobiography, Sadat pointed out that a
major goal of his initiative was to prove to President
Nixon and the world community that he was sincere in his
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desire for a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, Sadat
emphasized that he was ready "to conclude a peace agree-
ment with Israel... and give Israel all the guarantees
she asked for." He also indicated that he would restore
diplomatic relations with the United States as soon as
Israel withdrew its forces east of the Sinai passes.
[Ref. 7: p. 279]
3. The Israeli Reaction to Sadat's Proposal
According to Quandt , U.S. officials urged Israel
to consider Sadat's February 4 proposal very seriously.
Furthermore, the Egyptians were pressing the United States
to obtain from Israel a quick response. [Ref. 2: p. 137]
In a speech before the Knesset on February 9, Mrs. Meir
reaffirmed the now familiar Israeli formula: secure and
agreed upon borders and peace treaties with its neighbors,
achieved through direct negotiations. On the subject of
withdrawal, her speech was devoid of any hints of flexibility.
[Ref. 21: p. 35] She stated:
In the absence of peace Israel will continue to
maintain the situation as fixed at the time of the cease-
fire and will strengthen her position in keeping with
the vital needs of her security and development....
Israel will, therefore, never return to the borders
of June 4, 1967, which heightened the temptation for
aggression against our country. [Ref. 21: p. 35]
A few days after her speech, Mrs. Meir nearly
rejected Sadat's initiative outright during an interview
in Jerusalem. Quoted in Newsweek , Mrs. Meir stated:
"All (Sadat) wants is for us to begin to pull back...
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without even a peace agreement.... He didn't even say the
canal would be open (to Israeli shipping)." [Ref. 20:
pp. 37-38] The Israelis kept the door open just a crack
when they asked the U.S. on February 12 to convey to
Sadat their interest in discussing the opening of the
Suez Canal. The United States relayed their message on




At the State Department, many policy makers
regarded the period immediately following the announcement
of the Egyptian initiative as "the best opportunity we have
had for working out a peaceful settlement." [Ref. 20:
p. 38] Meanwhile, at the White House, Sadat's proposal
had absolutely no affect on the prevailing view of the nature
of the conflict in the Middle East. In his February 25
foreign policy report to Congress, Nixon not only failed
to mention Sadat's February 4 speech but reemphasized his
concern that a local conflict could ultimately lead to a
confrontation, possibly nuclear, between the superpowers.
Nixon did, however, call for direct negotiations between
the local part ies . [Ref. 22: pp. 388, 390] In his memoirs,
White House Years , Kissinger explained the incredible lack
of interest at the White House for Sadat's proposal: "Our
perception of the significance of Sadat's moves then was
unfortunately still beclouded by the presence of over 15,000
Soviet troops in Egypt...." [Ref. 5: p. 1280]
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Sadat was not discouraged by Nixon's silence on
his Suez Canal proposal. According to Quandt , Sadat wrote
Nixon on March 5 and appealed for an American initiative
to achieve a settlement based on the points of his February
4 speech. Nixon responded favorably to Sadat's request and
directed the State Department to begin studying the
feasibility of an interim Suez Canal agreement. [Ref. 2:
p. 138] As will be shown in the following section, Sadat's
letter and Nixon's response was preceded by the demise of
Jarring' s mediation efforts.
D. COLLAPSE OF THE JARRING MISSION
1 . Jarring ' s February 8 Letter to Israel and Egypt
Still harboring cautious optimism over the prospect
of making progress in negotiations with Israel and Egypt,
Ambassador Jarring launched his renewed peace mission in
early February. Searching for a means to prevent an immi-
nent deadlock between the different positions of Israel
and Egypt
,
Jarring sent both governments on February 8
identical letters* which sought from them "parallel and
simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable
prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement.'' [Ref. 23:
p. 158] Specifically, Jarring requested that the govern-
ments of Israel and Egypt make the following prior
*See Appendix C for entire text of Jarring' s letter
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commitments which would be "subject to the eventual satis-
factory determination of all other aspects of a peace
settlement"
:
Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its
forces from occupied U.A.R. territory to the former
international boundary between Egypt and the British
Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that
satisfactory arrangements are made for:
a. Establishing demilitarized zones;
b. Practical security arrangements in the Sharm
el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through the Straits of Tiran ; and
c. Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.
The U.A.R. would give a commitment to enter into a
peace agreement with Israel and to make explicit therein
to Israel—on a reciprocal basis—undertakings and
acknowledgements covering the following subjects:
a. Termination of all claims or states of belli-
gerency;
b. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
independence
;
c. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries
.
d. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure
that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate
from or are not committed from within the respective
territories against the population, citizens or property
of the other party; and
e. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.
[Ref. 23: p. 158]
In summary, Ambassador Jarring sought to improve his
chances for achieving a peaceful and agreed upon settlement
by putting forward his own views on the nature of that
settlement. The commitments, which he sought, were largely
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in accordance with the provisions of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242. By calling for the withdrawal of Israeli
forces to the former international border between Egypt
and the Palestine Mandate, Jarring was taking a stand which
collided with Israel's refusal to return to the pre-June 5,
1967 cease-fire lines. The Israeli response to his memoran-




On February 15, Jarring received Egypt's formal
reply* to his letter of February 8. By and large, the
Egyptian government accepted the various points of Jarring'
s
memorandum and stated that it would "be willing to enter
into a peace agreement with Israel," provided Israel accepted
the obligations contained in Resolution 242 and withdrew
from all occupied territories. Egypt went beyond Jarring'
s
points by calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the Gaza strip and "the establishment of a United
Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent
members of the Security Council would participate." [Ref.
33: pp. 158-59]
3. The Israeli Response
On February 26, Ambassador Jarring received the
Israeli response** to both his memorandum and the Egyptian
*See Appendix D for the Egyptian paper.
**See Appendix E for the Israeli document.
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position of February 15. The Israelis were pleased by
Egypt's expressed desire to conclude a peace agreement and
reaffirmed their call for direct and meaningful negotiations
between the two parties. On the crucial matter of withdrawal,
the Israelis agreed to consider the "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from the Israel-U. A . R. cease-fire line to the
secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established
in the peace agreement." Under no circumstances, however,
would Israel "withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines."
[Ref. 23: p. 159]
In the final paragraph of its February 26 statement,
the Israeli government appealed for constructive negotia-
tions between the two local parties without prior commit-
ments. The Israelis stated:
The Government of Israel believes that now that the
U.A.R. has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its
willingness to enter into a peace agreement with
Israel, and both parties have presented their basic
positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in
a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions
so as to cover all the points listed in their respective
documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement
.
[Ref. 23: p. 159]
4 . The Demise of the Jarring Mission
The Jarring Mission quickly reached a deadlock over
the matter of withdrawal from the occupied territories.
According to Reich, the Egyptians contended that the Israeli
response to Jarring 1 s February 8 memorandum was diplomatically
evasive and did not provide a prior commitment on withdrawal
,




On the other hand, the Israelis were adamant that
final borders could only be determined through direct nego-
tiations between the Israelis and their Arab neighbors.
Furthermore, they refused to make any commitment, prior
to negotiations, as to the nature of the final borders.
In an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave of Newsweek in
early March, Mrs. Meir discussed her government's view of
Sadat's initiative, Jarring 's memorandum, and Egypt's
apparent willingness to sign a peace treaty with Israel:
We haven't lost sight of the fact that something
(the recent Egyptian statements) important has happened.
If both sides are prepared to go on from there, something
of greater importance may take place. But there is one
stumbling block left which we hope will also be removed--
namely that Egypt is asking us to make prior commitments
before any negotiations can take place on outstanding
issues. If we are prepared to agree to their program,
then, and only then, are they prepared to enter into
a peace agreement. We don't set any preconditions and we
ask them not to set any either. We cannot accept any
preconditions. . .
.
We have said we are ready for meaningful negotiations
on all subjects and that we are prepared to withdraw
to borders that are secure, agreed and recognized.
[Ref. 24: p. 66]
Jarring was never able to reduce the enormous
differences between the two sides on the crucial questions
of withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the nature of
the ultimate peace agreement. After three years of
extraordinary frustration, it was quite possible that he
finally recognized the futility of further effort. In his
autobiography, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban criticizes
Jarring for the finality with which he regarded the Israeli
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and Egyptian positions. Furthermore, Eban places part of
the blame for the collapse of the Jarring mission squarely
on the United States. He writes:
The fact is that in their replies, the Egyptians made
more progress toward the idea of a peace agreement , and
the Israelis made more progress toward the concept of
withdrawal, than at any other previous stage. The wise
reaction would have been for Jarring to stress not the
gap that still remained, but the distance that had
already been bridged. He should have tried to elicit
the range and motive of Israel's reservation on full
withdrawal. He should also have explored the prospect
of bringing Egypt's declaration on peace closer to
what Israel would accept. He chose to regard the first
replies of each party as final answers and failed to no-
tice our offer to negotiate. The United States was fully
behind this erroneous reaction and must shore responsi-
bility for it. [Ref. 9: pp. 473-74]
By the end of February 1971, the Jarring mission
was moribund and would never again be seriously considered
as a means to obtain a settlement in the Middle East. At
this critical juncture, the search for an interim agreement
in the Israeli-Egyptian dispute was taken up by the United
States. The effort would be spearheaded by Secretary of
State William P. Rogers.
E . SUMMARY
During the first two months of 1971, a great deal was
said by the leaders of Egypt and Israel that indicated that
serious negotiations might be possible despite the exis-
tence of several significant differences between them. Un-
fortunately, Ambassador Jarring seemingly ignored these
encouraging signs and was consumed instead by the magnitude
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and insurmountability of the gaps that separated the parties.
With the positions of Israel and Egypt clearly delineated
and at their closest point of agreement since the June war,
Jarring suddenly brought his three year mission to an
inglorious end largely because of his own pessimism.
In the United States, the events of January and February
had very little impact on Middle East policy. At the White
House, Nixon and Kissinger were still bound up with great
power politics and were not at all distracted by Sadat's
proposal of February 4. As long as 10-15,000 Soviet military
personnel were in Egypt , the White House would not force
Israel to make any concessions irregardless of the protes-
tations of peace emanating from Cairo. It was not im-
probable, however, that secret negotiations carried out by
Kissinger or another high ranking emissary with Nixon's full
backing could have persuaded Egypt to abandon its demand
for prior Israeli commitments and Israel to be more forth-
right with regard to the location of the final borders.
Furthermore, with "significant progress" toward an interim
settlement achieved, Sadat might have been inclined to
scale down the Soviet presence in Egypt. Unfortunately, the
United States did not take advantage of the developments of
early 1971 by launching a top level initiative. Instead,
William P. Rogers set out for the Middle East with nominal
backing from his President and with his chances seriously
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undermined by the fact that he had promised Egypt , through
Riad, more than he could possibly deliver.
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V. THE ROGERS INITIATIVE AND THE SEARCH
FOR AN INTERIM SUEZ CANAL AGREEMENT
Between March and September 1971, the State Department
undertook with limited backing from the White House the
difficult and unenviable task of trying to achieve an
interim Suez Canal agreement between Egypt and Israel.
During this period, senior officials from the State
Department met frequently with the leaders of Egypt and
Israel in attempt to narrow the differences between them.
In the end, however, the Americans were unable to bring
the local parties nearer to agreement. Furthermore, the
unskillful diplomacy practiced by Rogers and his' lieutenants
nearly destroyed the highly coveted image of the United
States as a competent and impartial mediator.
A. ISRAELI APPREHENSIONS OVER AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE
In a press conference on March 16, Secretary Rogers
acknowledged the fact that the Jarring Mission had reached
a hopeless deadlock. He was confident, however, that the
impasse could be overcome and pledged that the United States
was "going to see that it is overcome." [Ref. 25: p. 478]
Unfortunately, Rogers's optimism and his new commitment to
resolving the Israeli-Egyptian dispute generated about as




Since early March, when Nixon directed Rogers to begin
working on an interim Suez Canal agreement, the Israelis
had exhibited significant nervousness over the growing
American involvement in Middle East peace efforts.
According to Quandt , the Israelis were distrustful of
Rogers whom they believed would support the Egyptian
proposals and pressure them for concessions. Furthermore,
they were concerned that Nixon and Kissinger might be
abandoning the close working relationship of the previous
September and were preparing to join Rogers in exerting
pressure on them. [Ref. 2: p. 138] According to The New
York Times
,
the Israelis charged that the United States
was already applying pressure in the form of delayed arms
shipments. [Ref. 26: pp. 1, 8]
Responding to what she perceived as mounting pressure
from several quarters, Mrs. Meir outlined on March 12
the Israeli position regarding secure and defensible borders.
Mrs. Meir stated that Israel must retain Sharm el-Sheikh
with an access road to it, the Gaza strip, the Golan Heights,
and West Jerusalem. She indicated that the final boundaries
in the Sinai and West Bank were negotiable but that the
Sinai Peninsula must be demilitarized. [Ref. 27: p. 1]
According to Quandt, a few days after Mrs. Meir's remarks,
Rogers urged Eban to consider the concept of great power
guarantees in place of territory as a means of maintaining
national security. [Ref. 2: p. 139]
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On March 22, the Israeli cabinet considered the idea of
a partial withdrawal in the Sinai in return for a pledge
from Egypt of something less than full peace. This principle
was vigorously advocated by Moshe Dayan , who had long
preferred a more defensible cease-fire line some ten to
thirty kilometers back from the canal. Eban outlines the
points made by Dayan at the meeting:
Dayan suggested ... a limited withdrawal from the Canal
in return for something less than peace. He proposed
that in return for a limited pullback, enabling Egypt
to open the Canal, Israel should ask for undertakings
that the state of war be ended, that future withdrawals
would be subject to negotiation, and that a normal civi-
lian situation would be created in the Canal area....
Another condition was that the United States should
make binding engagements on long-term military support of
Israel, and should supervise the demilitarized charac-
ter of the territory we evacuated. Dayan 's idea was that
Israeli forces be withdrawn some thirty kilometers from
the Canal up to the western edge of the Gidi and Mitla
passes. [Ref. 9: p. 474]
At the same meeting the Israeli cabinet accepted Dayan 's
idea of a partial withdrawal for less than full peace.
[Ref. 9: p. 474]
Meeting with Rogers and Kissinger in Washington at the
time of the Israeli Cabinet's decision, Eban encouraged the
United States to take up the partial withdrawal initiative
and establish immediate diplomatic contact with Egypt. Eban
emphasized that Israel would prefer the "good offices" of
the United States in place of Jarring or any other U.N.
mediator. [Ref. 9: pp. 474-75]
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B. THE U.S. -EGYPTIAN DIPLOMATIC CONTACT
According to Quandt
, Nixon sent Sadat a letter on
March 31 which lauded the Egyptian President for his February
4 proposal. [Ref. 2: p. 139] The next day, Sadat con-
tacted Donald Bergus
, the diplomat in charge of the American
interests section in Cairo, and outlined the latest Egyptian
terms for a settlement with Israel. As reported by the
Middle East News Agency, Sadat made the following points
to Bergus:
1. Egypt would agree to a formal cease-fire of
limited duration if Israel would agree to a partial
withdrawal of forces from the Sinai Peninsula.
2. The opening of the Suez Canal would follow the
partial Israeli withdrawal.
3. Egyptian troops would cross to the east bank
of the Canal but would be separated frcm Israeli forces
by a "neutral zone."
4. Egypt demands the ultimate withdrawal of all
Israeli forces from the occupied territories and rejects
any Israeli presence at Sharm el-Skeikh.
5. Egypt rejects the idea of a completely demili-
tarized Sinai but would agree to demilitarized zones "of
equal width on both sides of the (Israeli-Egyptian)
frontier." [Ref. 28: pp. 1, 12]
Back in Washington, Nixon Administration officials
immediately welcomed Sadat's April 1 proposal and referred
to it as a "strong reaffirmation" of the Egyptian President's
desire to achieve a partial Israeli withdrawal and the
reopening of the Suez Canal. American policy makers,
especially at the State Department, viewed a partial
withdrawal agreement as a means of breaking the diplomatic
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stalemate after the demise of the Jarring mission and
generating momentum toward a broader Middle East settle-
ment. [Ref. 29] On April 2, a State Department official
made the following comment: "Both sides seem genuinely
interested in finding a way to get the canal back in
operation. With any luck we may get them talking on this
in the next several weeks." [Ref. 30]
C. ISRAEL DECLARES ITS POSITION
For several weeks the United States had been urging
Israel to make an official response to Sadat's February 4
speech calling for an interim agreement between Egypt and
Israel which would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal.
Perhaps as an inducement to Israel
,
the Nixon Adminis-
tration unexpectedly announced on April 19 that it was
delivering 12 more F-4's to Israel and was considering
further Israeli arms requests as a means to offset large
scale Soviet military deliveries to Egypt. [Ref. 31: p.
1] With her confidence certainly bolstered by the American
announcement, Mrs. Meir outlined Israel's official position
regarding an interim settlement during a meeting that same
day with Foreign Minister Eban , Defense Minister Dayan, and
U.S. Ambassador Walworth Barbour.
As reported by The New York Times , the Israelis were
willing to discuss a partial withdrawal from the Suez
Canal under the following three conditions:
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-Egypt must declare that the state of belligerency
with Israel... is at an end, though such declaration
could fall short of a formal peace agreement.
-Concrete guarantees and sanctions must be defined
in advance in case there is any Egyptian or Soviet
attempt to cross the canal in force, following an Israeli
withdrawal
, or otherwise to seize strategic advantage
from an arrangement to reopen the canal....
-Israel will not accept any commitment , explicit or
implied, to further withdrawal from the occupied Sinai




the Israeli terms of an interim agreement
contained an end to Egyptian belligerency toward Israel, a
refusal to allow Egyptian or Soviet forces into the evacuated
areas of the Sinai Peninsula, and an adamant refusal to
link the interim accord to any subsequent agreement. As
will be seen, the Israeli position outlined on April 19
represented Israel's maximum concessions and left very
little room for compromise with Egypt.
As if their strict position was not enough, Israel,
according to Quandt , requested "full United States
support for its position and a reaffirmation of the
assurances" conveyed in Nixon's letter of December 3,
1970. On April 21, Nixon reconfirmed his earlier
assurances but withheld full and complete diplomatic support
for the Israeli position. [Ref. 2: p. 139] The United




On April 20, the United States transmitted the Israeli
memorandum to Egypt. [Ref. 3: p. 180] According to an
April 22 article in the authoritative Cairo daily, Al Ahrarn
,
the Egyptian government "categorically rejected" the condi-
tions for an interim withdrawal agreement put forth by
Israel on April 19. [Ref. 33]
D. STERNER MEETS SADAT
On April 23, Secretary Rogers publicly announced his
plans to visit several Middle East capitals, including
Cairo and Jerusalem, during the first week in May. Rogers
clearly hoped that his tour would produce moderation in
the Israeli and Egyptian positions and would "maintain and,
hopefully, accelerate the momentum toward peace." Referring
to Sadat's Suez Canal proposal, Rogers added: "We believe
there is an exceptional opportunity— and an opportunity that
must not be missed—to build on the progress that already
has been made." [Ref. 34: p. 593]
On the day before Rogers's announcement, Michael Sterner,
the desk officer for Egyptian affairs at the State Department,
held a lengthy exploratory meeting with President Sadat.
During the meeting, Sadat extended his official invitation
to Rogers and gave his reaction to the Israeli counterpro-
posal of April 19. [Ref. 33]
According to Quandt , Sadat outlined the following points,




Egyptian forces . . .must be allowed to cross the canal;
Egypt must control the strategically important Mitla and
Giddi passes; demilitarized zones could be established;
Israel could retain Sharm al-Shaykh (sic) in the first
stage, but within six months a full settlement must be
reached. If Israel were not prepared to give up the
passes. . .then the United States should end its
initiative. [Ref. 2: p. 140]
Rogers did not take Sadat's final point at face value, des-
pite the obvious fact that Israel would never accept Sadat's
terms for an interim agreement, particularly the demand
for a full settlement within six months. Undaunted by the
dim prospects for agreement and, as Quandt [Ref. 2: p. 140]
points out
,
the nearly complete lack of support from the
White House, Rogers launched his mission to achieve an in-
terim agreement between Egypt and Israel. His principle
objective was to sound out the Egyptian and Israeli leader-
ship and hopefully moderate their positions.
E. THE RCGERS-SISCO TOUR OF THE MIDDLE EAST
In May 1971, William P. Rogers became the first American
Secretary of State since John Foster Dulles in 1953 to
visit the Middle East. On May 4, Rogers and Assistant
Secretary of State Joseph Sisco arrived in Cairo and for
the next two days held a series of meetings with Egyptian
government officials, including Sadat. They would follow
their visit to Cairo with a trip to Jerusalem.
1. Rogers Meets Sadat
In his arrival statement, delivered in Cairo on
May 4, Rogers made the following comments, which represented
62

his sincere hope of making significant progress toward an
interim settlement:
I look forward to detailed discussions with President
Sadat and members of his Government. The United
Arab Republic and the United States share the goal
of a just and lasting peace agreement between Arabs
and Israelis, based squarely on the provisions of the
Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, in
all its parts. We believe there is now an opportunity
to make progress toward that goal-~an opportunity which
may not soon come again....
We are also prepared to explore with Egypt and Israel ,
in a concrete way, the possibility of an interim agree-
ment on opening the Suez Canal, which we hope would
contribute to a final settlement. [Ref. 35: p. 696]
In his meeting with Sadat later that day, Rogers,
according to Quandt , was impressed by Sadat's politeness,
charm, and willingness to be flexible. [Ref. 2: p. 140]
In an interview with Newsweek ' s Arnaud de Borchgrave
,
Sadat described the atmosphere of this meeting, his first
with a high ranking American official since becoming Presi-
dent: "We talked for two and a half hours. We felt at
ease in each other's company." [Ref. 36: p. 43]
According to journalist Mohammad Heikal, who was
present at the meeting, Rogers carried with him no new
proposals but simply outlined his understanding of the
principal components of a "partial solution": an inde-
finite cease-fire along the Suez Canal, an Egyptian agree-
ment to reopen the canal, and a partial Israeli withdrawal.
Furthermore, Rogers pointed out that the extent of Israel's
pull back in the Sinai must be balanced by the strength
of Egypt's commitment to peace. [Ref. 17: p. 132]
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The major portion of the meeting between Rogers
and Sadat concerned Sadat's interim Suez Canal proposal of
February 4. Sadat remained adamant that a partial Israeli
pull back must be linked to a commitment from Israel to
withdraw completely from the occupied Sinai. Furthermore,
he insisted that Egyptian forces must be allowed to return
to the east bank of the canal and that any reinstated
cease-fire must be for a limited, not indefinite, duration.
[Ref. 37] Sadat recounts his conversation with Rogers
on the subject of an interim settlement:
Mr. Rogers told me that the Israelis had contended
all along that we would never agree to a final peace
agreement and that I had now refuted Israel's basic
premise. Mr. Rogers ... said he had nothing more to
ask of me. 'You have done your utmost,' he said....
Bill (Rogers) said he was going to tell Mrs. Meir
that President Sadat had taken up her challeng'e and
had agreed to a permanent peace agreement. Because,
don't forget, Mrs. Meir had said over and over again
that if Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement— as
I told you last February we would--then she would put all
her cards on the table. Rogers said he was going to
ask Mrs. Meir to do just that. [Ref. 36: p. 43]
During the meeting of May 4, an interesting exchange
took place between Rogers and Egyptian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud Riad. According to Heikal , Riad complained that,
whereas Israel had yet to make any kind of commitment to
withdraw completely from the Sinai, the United States
continued to supply Israel with large quantities of modern
arms. Rogers supposedly responded by stating that the
United States was unable to apply pressure on Israel. At this
point, Riad exploded: "Is there no difference between the
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United States and Upper Volta...? You say you were trying
to put pressure on (Israel), but she rejects your pressure.
How do you explain this?" Riad ended his critical attack
by urging the United States to halt arms deliveries to
Israel as an effective means of pressure. [Ref. 17: p.
132] Rogers responded that such a course was not a realis-
tic option so long as the Soviet Union was supplying arms to
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in massive quantities and main-
taining a force of at least 10,000 troops in Egypt. In
response to this, Sadat made it clear that the Soviet
military personnel would leave immediately following the
first phase of an Israeli withdrawal. [Ref. 36: p. 43]
At the conclusion of the talks between Rogers and
Sadat , it was apparent that Rogers would be advocating an
interim agreement, loosely based on Sadat's February 4
proposal, during his upcoming discussions in Jerusalem.
It was also evident that Rogers would not be empowered
to exert pressure on Israel. By appearing to advocate
Sadat's proposal and swearing off the use of any forceful
persuasion in his dealings with the Israelis, Rogers was
for all practical purposes stifling his own initiative
just as it was starting. Nevertheless, Rogers was encouraged
by his meetings with the Egyptian leadership. In his depar-
ture statement on May 6, Rogers stated:
It is apparent from our talks here that there are
several elements which will require further explorations
and discussion. We also believe the parties hold
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parallel views on a number of principles which offer
opportunity for further fruitful explorat ions . . . .
I
intend to go into the matter in some detail and
specificity in Israel.... I can report to President
Nixon on my return that our ef forts ... have not been
without result and that I found in Cairo a determina-
tion— a firm determination—which we share, to con-
tinue working for a just and lasting peace settlement
based on Security Council Resolution 242 in all its
parts. [Ref. 35: p. 697]
2 . Rogers in Israel
The Israeli attitude toward the Rogers mission
could best be described as very suspicious. Rogers contri-
buted to this situation by making several blunt comments
during his arrival statement on May 6. He stated:
In a letter which I will deliver to the Prime
Minister, our President states his conviction that
Israel's security in the long run can only come from
a final binding peace settlement with its Arab
neighbors ....
This is an unusual time in our history. The nations
in this area have the opportunity to take wise and
decisive action. There are risks in agreeing to peace;
there are greater risks in failing to do so.
Israel has experienced and met the challenge and
agony of waging war. I am confident that Israel will
equally meet the challenge, and indeed the agony, of
making peace. [Ref. 35: pp. 697-98]
How could Rogers honestly expect Israel to show-
interest in an interim-agreement with Egypt
,
if peace was
pictured as being just as dangerous as war? Rogers's
arrival statement was the first of several blunders which
would hamper efforts by the State Department to achieve
an interim agreement for the rest of the year.
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During extensive meetings with Mrs. Meir, Dayan , and
Eban, Rogers was presented the points which would guide
Israel's consideration of a limited withdrawal agreement.
The principles, given to Rogers in Jerusalem, were later
outlined by Mrs. Meir in a speech before the Knesset on
June 9:
The fighting would not be resumed. Egypt would
clear and operate the Suez Canal. No Egyptian and or
other armed forces would cross to the eastern side of
the canal . There would be free passage for shipping
in the canal, including Israeli ships and cargoes.
Effective and agreed supervision procedures would be
established. Means of deterrence against the danger of
violation of the agreement would be assured. Removal of
Israeli defense forces from the water line would not
be a stage leading to a further withdrawal before peace.
Maintenance of the arrangement would not be dependent
upon the Jarring talks, but it would also not be incom-
patible with the holding, furtherance and aim of these
talks. The new line to be held by the Israeli defense
forces will not be considered the permanent boundary.
The permanent boundary between Israel and Egypt would be
determined in the peace treaty to be concluded between
us and Egypt, and Israel would withdraw to it. [Ref. 38]
Rogers quickly realized that the positions held by Israel
and Egypt on the specific issues were now "light-years" apart.
Following his meetings with Mrs. Meir and Eban,
Rogers met with Dayan, who put forward a five-stage plan
designed to prevent a deadlock from crippling Rogers's
mission. Although Dayan ' s proposal did not reflect Meir's
stubborn rhetoric, it did constitute an official Israeli
position. As reported by The New York Times , Dayan '
s
plan called for
Cairo to promise to allow ships of all nations, including
Israel, to use the (Suez Canal) waterway; a thinning of
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Israeli forces along the canal, a crossing to the eastern
shore by Egyptian technicians and civilian police but
with Israeli troops holding fortifications along the
waterways, and then a reopening of the canal to be
followed by talks on an Israeli pullback. [Ref. 37]
The Israelis hoped that their guarantee of withdrawal nego-
tiations and the concession permitting Egyptian police and
technicians on the east bank of the canal would encourage
flexibility on the part of Sadai
.
On May 8, Sisco was dispatched to Cairo where he
would discuss Dayan's proposal with Sadat, Following his
meeting with the Egyptian President, he would report
immediately to Rogers. [Ref. 37]
3 . Sisco Meets with Sadat
On May 9, Sisco conferred for four hours with Presi-
dent Sadat. [Ref. 37] Sadat was briefed on the recent
discussions between Rogers and the Israeli government and
was presented Dayan's proposal.
According to Sadat , Sisco told him that the Israelis
rejected his February 4 proposal for three major reasons:
"'First, the Israelis didn't want (Egyptian) forces to
cross the canal. Second, they wanted an unlimited cease-fire
and, third, they wanted no mention of the international
borders of June 5, 1967. M [Ref. 36: p. 43]. After Sisco
pointed out that the Israelis would be willing to allow
the stationing of Egyptian civilian police and technicians
on the east bank, Sadat countered by stating that he would
be willing to discuss a limited Egyptian military force on
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the east bank but indicated that he could not abandon the
principle that Egyptian forces have the right to occupy
their own territory. [Ref. 36: p. 43] "After all,"
Sadat emphasized, "It's my country we're talking about."
[Ref. 36: p. 43]
Sadat was extremely eager to negotiate a withdrawal
agreement with Israel. He recalls the following exchange
with Sisco over the positioning of Israeli and Egyptian
forces in the Sinai Peninsula:
'How are you going to be flexible?' Joe (Sisco) asked.
I said I was ready to compromise. So Joe drew two
theoretical lines—Egypt ian forces, he said, would
be on line A to B on the eastern side of the canal
and Israeli forces on line X to Y also on the eastern
side.... I said I was perfectly willing to accept that
armaments should be equal on both sides ... .More than
that, I said I was ready to agree that between these
two lines U.N. forces or troops from the four powers*...
should take up position. Sisco said: 'I think we
can work something out on this basis. It sounds
reasonable to me.' [Ref. 36: p. 43]
According to Quandt , Sadat asked Sisco if it was possible
that Israel might agree to withdraw to a line east of the
Sinai passes. Sisco indicated that he would discuss this
with Rogers and the Israelis. [Ref. 2: p. 141]
On the question of the duration of the cease-fire,
Sadat stated that he would agree to an extension beyond
six months only if Ambassador Jarring was making progress
and required more time to conclude an agreement. [Ref. 36:





p. 44] Sadat still believed that Jarring's mission could
be revived and would be capable of making significant
progress
.
On the point of the pre-June 5, 1967 cease-fire
lines, Sadat demanded that either the Security Council or
the four powers make a formal declaration stating that
these lines are the recognized final boundaries between
Egypt and Israel. In essence, Sadat was calling on the great
powers to impose a set of borders on Israel. Incredibly,
Sisco led Sadat to believe that his position on the borders
was reasonable and that the United States would support him!
According to Quandt , Sadat's hopes were raised even
further when Sisco contacted him on May 18 and stated that
the Israelis would not rule out a pullback to a line east
of the passes. Sisco emphasized that the Israelis were
remaining flexible on the whole matter of withdrawal.
[Ref. 2: p. 141]
4. The Effect of Rogers's Tour
In a press conference in Rome on May 8, Rogers
exhibited optimism that progress would be forthcoming and
that Egypt and Israel had agreed on the following principles:
(1) That the Suez should be opened; (2) that if opened
that it will be run by Egypt; (3) that there will be
some withdrawal under conditions that will be acceptable
to both sides; (4) that the fighting will not be resumed;
and (5) that (an interim Suez Canal agreement) is not an
end in itself, that it will be a step forward in the
hope that we can implement Security Council Resolution
242. [Ref. 35: p. 702]
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Rogers also noted that several major areas of disagreement
remained between the two sides. According to Reich, these
areas included "the scope of the Israeli withdrawal, super-
vision of the evacuated area, the extent of Egyptian
crossing of the canal..., and the Egyptian insistence that
this be only a first step toward total withdrawal...."
[Ref. 3: p. 181]
Without question the Rogers-Sisco tour of the Middle
East severely damaged prospects for an interim agreement
between Egypt and Israel. Unwittingly perhaps, Rogers and
Sisco practiced a very subtle form of deception with Egypt
and Israel in order to reduce the differences between them
and bring them closer to agreement. In Israel, Rogers
presented the Egyptian positions* as being rational and
moderate. Conversely, Sisco raised Sadat's hopes to an
unreasonable level by intimating that Israel might actually
accept some of Egypt's extreme positions. Needless to say,
the damage was done and its effect on future U.S. Middle East
diplomacy was staggering. Quandt comments on the net
effect of the Rogers trip to the Middle East:
Instead of succeeding in convincing either party of
the other's good intentions, Rogers and Sisco seemed
instead to lose credibility, especially with the
Israelis. With the Egyptians it took a bit longer,
but ultimately the sense of deception was equally
great. At the White House, meanwhile, support for
Rogers and Sisco was quickly fading. [Ref. 2: p. 141]
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F. THE BERGUS MEMORANDUM
On May 20, Donald Bergus, the head of the American
interests section in Cairo, met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud
Riad and received the official Egyptian response to the
Israeli proposal presented by Sisco on May 9. According
to Quandt , Bergus regarded the Egyptian paper as so
negative that it would only hasten the collapse of the
American initiative. [Ref. 2: p. 141] On May 23, Bergus
returned to the Foreign Ministry and presented Riad's
deputy with a redraft of the Egyptian paper. According to
Heikal , Bergus insisted that he was acting on his own
initiative and that he was attempting to help Egypt eliminate
the "failures in presentation" which had always hampered its
diplomatic efforts in the past. [Ref. 17: p. 146] Heikal
points out that Egyptian officials were highly suspicious
of Bergus 's motives and doubted that the redraft had been
his own idea. For the most part, the Egyptians viewed the
Bergus memorandum as an American initiative under the guise
of Egyptian authorship. [Ref. 17: p. 141]
G. THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY
On May 2, two days before Rogers's arrival in Cairo,
Sadat dismissed the powerful secretary-general of the
Arab Socialist Union, Ali Sabri . Sabri, who was well
known for his advocacy of stronger political ties between
Egypt and the Soviet Union, was suspected by Sadat of
plotting his forceful removal from power. Fearing that
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their relationship with Egypt had been severely damaged by
the dismissal of their leading supporter, the Soviets sought
a treaty of friendship with Sadat as a means of consolidating
their position in the country. Soviet President Nikolai
Podgorny arrived in Cairo on May 25 and, after two days of
discussion, he and Sadat signed on May 27 a fifteen-year
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. [Ref. 3: p. 183]
1 . Sadat's Attitude Toward the Soviet Union
Although American policy makers were surprised by
the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, few believed that it would
eliminate all chances for an interim agreement. [Ref. 39:
p. 6] To Americans, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty merely
served to formalize an already very extensive relationship.
The treaty did prevent, however, observers in the West
from appreciating Anwar el-Sadat's true feelings toward the
Soviet Union.
Few observers realized that the treaty meant very
little politically and personally to Sadat. In his auto-
biography, Sadat points out that he warned the Soviets on
the negative political ramifications of signing such a treaty
immediately following the dismissal of their principal ally,
Ali Sabri. Furthermore, Sadat gives as his primary reason
for concluding the treaty the fact that Nasser had vigorous-
ly sought one since the June war. [Ref. 7: pp. 283-84]
Sadat may have been trying to placate the Soviets on their
apparent loss in order to maintain the flow of arms to Egypt.
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In his autobiography, Sadat reveals that his
suspicions toward the Soviet Union started in the dark
days immediately following the June 1967 war. He recalls
the following incident:
The War Minister returned from the Soviet Union,
having concluded an arms deal—with no delivery times
specified, which was normal for the Soviet Union. As
always, the Russian leadership wanted to complicate the
situation but , more important , they wanted to fix the
times themselves and so secure their control of the
situation. [Ref. 7: p. 173 J
Reflecting on the nature of this relationship in 1967,
Sadat comments:
This was... why 1 took my later decision to expel the
Soviet military experts from Egypt . . . . I know my coun-
try's interests better than the Soviet Union, and I
cannot accept that a guardian power should manage our
own affairs. [Ref. 7: p. 173]
After assuming the Presidency, Sadat continued
Nasser's delicate policy toward the Soviet Union.
According to Heikal , this policy was tantamount to a
balancing act: maintain close political and military ties
with the Soviets but do not let them dominate your domestic
affairs; at the same time, keep the door open to the United
States. [Ref. 17: pp. 165-66]
Throughout his first year in office, Sadat pursued
this policy toward the Soviet Union. He sought expanded
arms shipments from the Soviets and a diplomatic initiative
from the Americans. By the late summer and fall of 1971,
however, Sadat's patience with the Soviet leadership began
to wear thin. Reflecting in his autobiography on a promise
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made by Podgcrny in May that Soviet arms would be arriving
within four days, Sadat makes the following comment after
waiting four months without word from Moscow:
The Soviet leaders were in the habit of falling silent,
as silent as the grave, for long periods of time—which
annoyed me, I suppose, more than anything else. I
often summoned the Soviet ambassador, I wrote to them
frequently, but the answer was invariably silence. It
was as though one was communicating with imaginary
people. [Ref. 7: pp. 225-26]
2
.
U.S. Reaction to the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty
At the State Department , the Friendship Treaty was
seen as a surprise development that would certainly compli-
cate American efforts to bring about agreement between
Israel and Egypt. Policy makers realized that a formal
relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union would make
Israel extremely reluctant to discuss even a partial
withdrawal from the Sinai. The fears of American officials
were realized when Mrs. Meir made the following statement
during her June 9 speech in the Knesset
:
The Soviet-Egyptian treaty possesses a significance
extending beyond the sphere of Israeli-Egyptian relations.
Egypt has undertaken to coordinate with the Soviet Union
her moves and positions in the world political arena.
The Soviet Union has gained control of Egypt's policy.
[Ref. 38]
At another point in her speech, Mrs. Meir referred to
Egypt's "colonial servitude" to the Soviet Union. [Ref.
38]
In a memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger argued that the
treaty could give the Soviets a veto over Egyptian foreign
policy decisions, especially concerning negotiations with
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Israel. Furthermore, Kissinger warned that the treaty
could indicate a Soviet commitment "to engage themselves as
never before in case of resumption of hostilities."
[Ref. 5: p. 1284]
In his memoirs, White House Years
,
Kissinger points
out that the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty served to
strengthen the resolve at the White House to maintain
Israel's military strength and to limit U.S. efforts to
assist Sadat in achieving his diplomatic goals. Kissinger
summarizes the effects of the treaty from the perspective
of the White House:
Our strategy had to be to frustrate any Egyptian policy
based on military threats and collusion with the Soviet
Union. Therefore, Sadat's Friendship Treaty with the
Soviets, whatever its motives did not galvanize us to
help him as he might have hoped. On the contrary, it
reinforced my determination to slow down the process
even further to demonstrate that Soviet threats and
treaties could not be decisive. [Ref. 5: p. 1285]
In spite of the recent Soviet-Egyptian Friendship
Treaty and lukewarm support for its initiative at the
White House, the State Department, under the dauntless
leadership of William P. Rogers, pressed on with its efforts
to achieve an interim Suez Canal agreement between Egypt
and Israel.
H. SADAT'S CONTACTS WITH THE U.S.
1 . Furor Over the Bergus Memorandum
In the days immediately following the conclusion
of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, Bergus met
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several times with Sadat and other high ranking Egyptian
officials. In a meeting on May 30, Sadat told Bergus that
the treaty with the Soviet Union did not diminish in any
way his strong desire for an interim-agreement with Israel.
[Ref. 2: p. 142] On June 4, Bergus received from Sadat
the official Egyptian response to the Israeli proposal of
early May. Sadat points out in his December 1971 Newsweek
interview that the Egyptian paper was nearly identical to
Bergus ' s memorandum of May 23 and contained all the points
discussed with Sisco on May 9. [Ref. 36: p. 44] Further-
more, according to The New York Times
,
the Egyptians were
firmly convinced that Bergus' s memorandum represented
official American and Israeli policies. [Ref. 40] Bergus
delivered the latest Egyptian paper to Rogers on June 6.
[Ref. 41]
Sadat's optimism was quickly dashed when word of the
Bergus memorandum was leaked by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry
on June 26. The State Department quickly disavowed the
memorandum, emphasizing that it did not reflect official
U.S. policy. [Ref. 40] The effect of the Bergus memoran-
dum fiasco on both the Egyptians and the Israelis was
profound. Kissinger comments on this incredible episode in
American diplomatic history:
The Egyptians were now doubly angry, stung by our dis-
avowal and bitter that we could not deliver on what they
had assumed represented our own idea. The Israelis
were enraged that we were encouraging Egypt to put
forward terms which they had told us they would never
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accept. I was annoyed .. .that none of these moves
had been disclosed to the President of the United
States. [Ref. 5: p. 1284]
2 . Bergus and Sterner Meet with Sadat
By the start of July, it appeared that the chances
for an interim Suez Canal agreement were virtually non-
existent. Secretary Rogers acknowledged that several areas
of major differences still existed between the two sides.
[Ref. 39: p. 6] Furthermore, the parties were rapidly
losing their confidence in the United States, especially
in the wake of the Bergus affair. According to Reich,
the Egyptians expressed doubt that the United States was
capable of negotiating a Middle East settlement and warned
of renewed hostilities. The Egyptian press went so far as
to label the U.S-. initiative a trick, designed to freeze
the Middle East situation in Israel's favor. [Ref. 3: p.
184-85] On the other hand, the Israelis were profoundly
suspicious of U.S. motives with regard to the negotiations.
The Bergus memorandum did little to dispell the belief held
by many Israelis that the United States, especially the
State Department, was becoming increasingly more pro-Arab.
In an attempt to keep the Suez Canal initiative
alive, Rogers dispatched Sterner to Cairo to hold con-
sultations with Egyptian officials and to convey to them
the State Department's "latest thinking" regarding the
interim settlement concept. [Ref. 42: p. A2 ] The visit




On July 6, Sterner and Bergus met with Sadat and
requested his response to a series of questions regarding
his position toward an interim agreement. In the December
1971 Newsweek interview, Sadat recalls this discussion with
the two American diplomats:
Nixon wanted to know if the treaty .. .between us and
the Soviet Union had changed anything in our position
since I last talked with Bill Rogers. No, I replied,
the treaty was only a new frame for already existing rela-
tions.... The President's second question .. .was whether
I would. .. restore diplomatic relations with the U.S.
after the first phase of an Israeli withdrawal. Yes,
I said. Perhaps even before that phase is actually
completed. And the third question was whether I...
intended to send Soviet personnel home at the end of
phase one. I said yes, because ... I 'm the one who has the
financial difficulties (a shortage of hard currency).
[Ref. 36: p. 44]
Apparently satisfied with Sadat's answers, Sterner sur-
prised him with the following announcement: ''According
to my instructions, I would like to tell you that now I
have received your reply, the U.S. President, as from mid-
night... will personally intervene to start the ball rolling
for a peaceful solution to be reached." [Ref. 7: p. 285]
With his optimism buoyed and his confidence in the United
States restored, Sadat responded: "Give me a piece of paper
with reasonable terms on it, and I'm ready to sign it here
and now, under this (old ficus) tree." [Ref. 17: p. 141]
Sadat fully expected that close and steady consul-
tations with the United States would follow. As it turned
out, Sadat would not hear again from the United States until
mid-October, three months after Sterner 's visit to Cairo.
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I. SISCO'S VISIT TO ISRAEL
Sterner' s statement that Nixon was prepared to devote
his energies to the achievement of a settlement to the
Egyptian-Israeli dispute was perhaps another deceptive ploy
by the State Department to keep Sadat's interest alive in
working toward a settlement. According to Quandt , a deep
personal involvement in the affairs of the Middle East
was probably the last thing Nixon wanted in the summer of
1971. He actually discouraged Rogers from making another
trip to the Middle East believing that insufficient grounds
for agreement existed between Egypt and Israel. Foremost
on Nixon's foreign policy agenda were two crucial projects
undertaken by Kissinger in strictest secrecy: cease-fire
talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris and the initial
contacts with officials of the People's Republic of China.
[Ref. 2: pp. 142-43] Nixon perceived the Middle East
situation as a dangerous distraction that would have to wait
until more crucial issues, such as Vietnam, detente, and
China, were thoroughly addressed. Furthermore, Nixon be-
lieved that a serious diplomatic setback in the Middle
East would significantly erode his domestic base at a time
when he needed strong popular support to deal effectively
with the other issues.
Following the return of Kissinger from his successful
trip to China in mid-July, Rogers and Sisco met with Nixon
and Kissinger at San Clemente to discuss the situation in
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the Middle East. According to Quandt , Rogers pointed out
that Sadat was still very interested in obtaining an
interim agreement with Israel but was becoming increasingly
impatient to see some sign of progress. Nixon reluctantly
consented to allow Sisco to return to Israel for consulta-
tions with the Meir government. Nixon hoped that Sisco
could convince the Israelis to allow a small Egyptian
armed force east of the canal but made it clear that under
no circumstances would the U.S. government pressure the
Israelis to make any concessions. [Ref. 2: p. 142] In
other words, Sisco would be completely on his own.
Sisco met with senior Israeli officials, including
Mrs. Meir, on July 30 and August 2 and 4. [Ref. 3: p.
224 (note 131)] As could be expected, Sisco 'ts visit yielded
absolutely nothing. [Ref. 17: p. 141] In his departure
statement in Tel Aviv on August 5, Sisco admitted that he
"expected no decisive breakthroughs (and) none were achieved."
[Ref. 43: p. 259] Sisco was so disappointed by his mission
to Israel that he did not even stop in Cairo to brief
Sadat. In fact, Sadat heard nothing more from the United
States for more than two months. [Ref. 36: p. 44]
Sisco' s mission to Israel marked the end of the American
initiative which had begun in late March.
J. SADAT LOSES CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Sadat's disenchantment with American diplomacy steadily
increased during the latter half of the summer of 1971.
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On July 23, during his speech commemorating the anniver-
sary of the Egyptian Revolution, Sadat proclaimed 1971 as
the "year of decision." He emphasized that the year would
witness the final resolution, whether by peaceful means or
by war, of the conflict between Egypt and Israel. He
affirmed that Egypt was prepared to meet every sacrifice,
including the loss of a million men, to recover its lost
territory. [Ref. 3: p. 186] The "year of decision"
quickly became a familiar rhetorical theme used frequently
by Sadat in public speeches during the remainder of the
year
.
In a nationally televised speech on September 16,
Sadat severely criticized the efforts of the United States
to achieve an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel.
He accused the U.S. of procrastination and deception. [Ref.
3: p. 186] Furthermore, he complained that, whereas Sterner
had promised him on July 6 a renewed American initiative
to achieve an interim Suez Canal agreement , no American
official had contacted him since that date, not even to
brief him on Sisco's recent trip to Israel. [Ref. 36:
p. 44] Sadat soon realized that Sisco's mission must have
been a dismal failure.
K . SUMMARY
In retrospect, both the Rogers initiative and the
State Department's conduct of Middle East diplomacy contri-
buted significantly to the disappointment and frustration
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of Egyptian officials after having raised their hopes and
expectations to an unprecedented level. The image of
American fairness was severely tarnished in the eyes of
the leadership of the Arab world's most powerful and popu-
lous country. By the fall of 1971, it was apparent that it
would take a monumental effort on the part of the United
States to improve its standing among the revolutionary
republics of the Arab core. Unfortunately, such an effort
would not come until after the disastrous events of October
1973. Following that conflict, the United States finally
committed its full diplomatic resources to the problems
of the Middle East.
The demise of the Rogers initiative was certainly not
mourned in Jerusalem. The Israelis had been extremely
critical of Rogers ever since December 1969 when he unveiled
the plan that would bear his name. The Israelis were hope-
ful that the collapse of his mission would spell the end of
the State Department's efforts to obtain a settlement in the
Israeli-Egyptian dispute. Furthermore, with the White House
preoccupied with problems outside the Middle East and with
the belief that Nixon was firmly on their side, the Israelis
were confident that they could continue their occupation
of the conquered Arab territories—thus maintaining the




A particularly serious mistake by American policy makers
at both the White House and the State Department during
this period was the immediate and unanimous conclusion
that the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Coopera-
tion represented a strong and durable relationship between
the two countries. An attempt by the United States to
determine Sadat's actual motives with regard to the treaty
might have prevented Nixon and Kissinger from hardening
their views concerning an Israeli pullback from the Suez
Canal. Without an accurate appreciation of the origins
of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, the White House was deter-
mined to keep Israel strong and free from pressure and to
withhold its full support for Rogers and his now hopeless
initiative. With the treaty freshly signed and with over
10,000 Soviet troops stationed in Egypt, the White House
considered it highly dangerous and illogical for the Israelis
to agree to a partial withdrawal from the Sinai. Therefore,
Nixon and Kissinger were committed to inaction on the
Israeli-Egyptian diplomatic front until the Soviets
departed. It will be seen in the following chapter




VI. A "YEAR OF DECISION" AND FRUSTRATION
This final section of the case study, covering the
period September 1971 to February 1972, was largely anti-
climatic following in the wake of the failure of the Rogers
Suez Canal initiative. However, several developments
during this period were significant and served to remove
effectively any reasonable hope that the United States was
truly capable of securing an agreement of any kind between
Egypt and Israel.
In the fail of 1971, Kissinger took charge of Middle
East policy and designed a negotiating strategy which
featured an interim agreement, unlinked to a final settle-
ment, between Egypt and Israel. Unfortunately, he was not
planning to take up the problems of the Middle East until
after the elections in November 1972. Furthermore, his
efforts would be restrained until the Soviets departed from
Egypt
.
It will be shown that the image of the United States
as an impartial mediator was virtually destroyed during
this period. First, the Israelis condemned Rogers's six-
point plan for a Suez Canal agreement for its pro-Egyptian
appearance. Second, Sadat lost all confidence in the good
offices of the United States following the conclusion of two
85

memoranda of understanding and a major arms agreement
between the U.S. and Israel.
By the beginning of March 1972, Israel was enjoying
extremely close relations with the U.S. and was reason-
ably confident that it would not be pressured into
making an agreement with Egypt. Sadat, on the other band,
reaffirmed his support for the maximum Arab program and
turned to the Soviet Union for increased military and
diplomatic support. Thus, without realizing it the United
States allowed the best chance to achieve a Middle East
settlement—-of any kind—between 1967 and 1973 to slip irre-
coverably from its grasp.
A. KISSINGER 'TAKES COMPLETE CHARGE OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY
The failure of the Suez Canal initiative effectively
ended the dominance of the State Department over the day to
day management of U.S. Middle East policy. According to
Quandt , the demise of the Rogers initiative satisfied
policy makers at the White House, especially Henry A.
Kissinger, who had long been very critical of Rogers's
abilities and his handling of Middle East diplomacy. [Ref.
2: pp. 143-44] He was undoubtedly pleased by the shift of
responsibility over Middle East policy from the State Depart-
ment to the White House. This development would give him





1. "Keeping Things Quiet "
In White House Years
, Kissinger points out that
the major factor leading to his more active involvement in
Middle East policy was Nixon's serious concern for "keeping
things quiet until after the 1972 election." Nixon dreaded
the thought of the eruption of a series of crises in the
Middle East during the upcoming election year. [Ref. 5:
pp. 1285, 1287] Furthermore, he believed that another
American initiative, undertaken without the existence of
some significant areas of agreement between the local
parties, would be doomed to fail and would only contribute




Charged by Nixon to keep the lid on the Middle East
situation in addition to his other monumental foreign policy
tasks, Kissinger met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko in Washington on two occasions in September 1971
to determine if the Soviets and their Arab clients were
willing to moderate their extreme positions in order to
achieve a Middle East settlement, interim or otherwise.
Kissinger made it clear to Gromyko that he preferred explora-
tory talks first because he was extremely reluctant to
commit his energies to a major diplomatic effort unless
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he was fairly certain that progress toward a settlement was
possible.* [Ref. 5: p. 1287]
Kissinger argued for an interim agreement unlinked
to a final settlement. He believed that the major signi-
ficance of such an agreement was the tremendous symbolic
value to the Arabs of a partial Israeli pullback in the
Sinai. In his view, it was immaterial "whether the
Israelis withdrew forty kilometers or twenty kilometers
from the Canal." [Ref. 5: pp. 1287-88] On the other hand,
Gromyko ' s remarks left little doubt that the Soviet Union
was still staunchly supporting the maximum Arab position.
According to Kissinger,
He insisted that an interim agreement be linked
specifically and in detail to a final settlement. He
argued that there could be ho first stage until a final
settlement had been worked out and a precise timetable
had been established: The final settlement in the
Soviet view should occur no later than a year
after the interim agreement .... He maintained that a
final settlement had to involve total Israeli withdrawal
from the occupied territories of all Arab states.
[Ref. 5: p. 1288]
Kissinger was convinced by his meetings with Gromyko
that the Soviet Union would only serve as a hindrance to
American efforts to achieve a settlement to the Israeli-
Egyptian dispute. Realizing that the Soviets would not
pressure their Arab friends to adopt a more flexible
Kissinger once responded to Egyptian diplomat Ashraf
Ghorbal ' s plea for his involvement in Middle East diplomacy
with this statement: "I will never get involved in anything
unless I'm sure of success. And if I do get involved, it
means I'm going to succeed. I hate failure. (The Middle
East) isn't ready for me." [Ref. 44: p. 17]
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position, Kissinger set out to design a Middle East nego-
tiating strategy which he would implement, if given the
opportunity, after the elections the following November.
3. Shaping a Strategy
Following the collapse of the Rogers initiative,
Kissinger reviewed many of the factors which contributed
to its failure. According to Quandt , Kissinger drew a number
of lessons from the Rogers-Sisco experience that would guide
his future dealings with the problems of the Middle East.
First, Rogers had involved the U.S. too quickly in substan-
tive negotiations between the local parties. Kissinger
would withhold significant involvement until the parties
were near agreement. Second, Rogers and Sisco had not been
completely honest in their dealings with Egypt and Israel.
Kissinger planned to represent accurately each party's
position and thus prevent the raising of false hopes and
expectations. Third, Kissinger would not repeat the mistake
of Rogers and Sisco of negotiating "in the glare of publi-
city." Henceforth, all substantive negotiations would be
conducted in secret. Fourth, Kissinger would not threaten
to withhold arms shipments to Israel as a means of persuading
it to modify its positions. He realized that the Israelis
would refuse to make concessions from a perceived position
of weakness. Furthermore, as long as the Soviets were
present in huge numbers in Egypt , it was completely
illogical to pursue a program of threats directed against
89

Israel. Finally and perhaps most important, Kissinger
strongly advocated the concept of an interim agreement
unlinked to a final settlement. He envisioned an agree-
ment worked out largely by the U.S. that would generate
momentum toward a final settlement and would contribute to
the removal of the Soviet advisers from Egypt. [Ref. 2:
pp. 144-45] In White House Years , Kissinger describes the
significance of an interim agreement:
Disengagement had no chance of success as long as
it had to be negotiated together with an overall settle-
ment.... To succeed, an interim agreement therefore had to
be separated from the comprehensive settlement; if they
were linked, we would merely dissipate our influence by
chasing a mirage that had all the difficulties of the
comprehensive schemes it purported to replace and that
we were no more able to produce than Moscow. . . .At various
times each side was led to believe that we sympathized
with its version of the interim concept; disillusionment,
frustration, and stalemate were the inevitable result.
My idea was to use an interim agreement to break
the impasse. Once achieved, such a step would ease the
way to further advances. [Ref. 5: p. 1281]
B. ROGER'S LAST TRY AT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT
1 . Rogers Meets with Riad
Despite the growing dominance of the White House over
Middle East diplomacy, Rogers attempted to revive his mori-
bund initiative in late September. During a meeting with
Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad at the State Depart-
ment on 29 September, Rogers pointed out that the United
States would not force Israel to make a commitment to
withdraw from all occupied territories; however, he assured
Riad that the U.S. regarded an interim agreement as a
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positive indication of progress toward an overall settle-
ment. Therefore, under no circumstances would the United
States, in the words of Mohammad Heikal , "make the interim-
agreement an end in itself." [Ref. 17: pp. 153-54]
2
.
Rogers's October 4 Speech at the U.N.
In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on
October 4, Rogers outlined the U.S. position regarding
a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He stressed the
vital importance of a lasting peace in the region but called
on Israel and Egypt to conclude an interim Suez Canal agree-
ment as the next step* toward the complete implementation
of Resolution 242. [Ref. 45: pp. 442-43] Rogers then
outlined six points which he hoped would provide the necessary
"breakthrough" in the negotiation of an interim agreement:
(1) the recognition of an interim agreement as merely a
step toward an overall settlement; (2) a cease-fire of more
than a "short duration"; (3) a zone of withdrawal that
addressed "the principal concerns of both sides;" (4) ade-
quate "supervisory mechanisms" to ensure that both parties
maintain confidence in the agreement; (5) the existence
of Egyptian civilian personnel east of the canal with the
question of military personnel left for further discussion;
and (6) the use of the reopened Suez Canal by all nations,
including Israel. [Ref. 45: p. 443]
*According to Rogers, the first step was Resolution 242
and the second was the August 7, 1970 Suez Canal cease-fire.
[Ref. 45: p. 442]
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Furthermore, Rogers argued "that the logic for
such an agreement is overwhelming." [Ref. 45: p. 444]
He cited the following advantages of an interim Suez Canal
agreement
:
It would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a
waterway for international shipping.
It would reestablish Egypt's authority over a major
national asset.
It would separate the combatants.
It would produce the first Israeli withdrawal.
It would extend the cease-fire.
It would diminish the risk of major-power involve-
ment .
It would be an important step toward the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolution 242. [Ref. 45:
p. 444]
Rogers confirmed that the United States was
committed to playing "a constructive role in ihe process
of arriving at an agreement." In closing, Rogers emphasized
that "the United States pledges anew its best efforts."
[Ref. 45: pp. 443-44]
3. Israeli Reaction to Rogers's Speech
Rogers's six-point proposal was not well received
in Jerusalem. Mrs. Meir and other Israeli officials were
concerned because it appeared that the official U.S. posi-
tion had moved very close to that held by Egypt. In an
interview shortly after Rogers's speech, Mrs. Meir commented
that "to my mind this speech—most regrettably—did not
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contribute to the promotion of the special settlement for
the opening of the Suez Canal." [Ref. 3: p. 188]
In a speech before the Knesset on 26 October,
Mrs. Meir articulated the official Israeli response to
Rogers's latest proposal, which was viewed by many in
Israel as the third Rogers Plan.* She objected to the idea
of independent proposals put forward by the United States
and reaffirmed her strong willingness to hold direct
negotiations with the Egyptians. More importantly, she
pointed out that "there have been disturbing changes in the
approach of the United States to several items of the canal
settlement." [Ref. 3: pp. 188-89] Reich outlines the
differences betwreen the Israeli and U.S. positions con-
cerning an interim settlement:
.While Israel sought an unlimited cease-fire, the
United States had begun to talk of a cease-fire of a
specified duration. Israel opposed the crossing of
the canal by any Egyptian forces, while the United States
had begun to talk about some Egyptian troops crossing
the canal, thus acquiescing in principle that Egyptian
military forces should cross the canal. Israel had
opposed the linking of this agreement with an overall
agreement and now Rogers suggested that this would be
linked to the full implementation of 242. [Ref. 3:
p. 189]
Mrs. Meir went on to reaffirm Israel's official posi-
tion on an interim canal agreement. Concerning the areas of
difference with the United States, she made the following
points
:
*The first Rogers Plan was made public on December 9 and
18, 1969; the second on June 25, 1970.
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Israel and Egypt will observe an unlimited cease-
fire ....
Egyptian Armed Forces .. .will not cross the canal
and will not be introduced into the area east of the
canal from which Israeli forces will withdraw. . .
.
The (interim) agreement will not prevent the
parties from continuing negotiations between them. .
.
with a view to progress toward a just and lasting
peace. [Ref. 3: p. 189]
4. Rogers Proposes Proximity Talks
Toward the end of October, Rogers proposed to
Egypt and Israel that they send high ranking emissaries
to New York to engage in indirect negotiations on the
reopening of the Suez Canal. [Ref. 46: p. 8] These nego-
tiations were referred to as "proximity talks" because the
representatives of the two countries would be located in
nearby hotels and would meet separately with Assistant
Secretary Sisco , who would act as the intermediary and
attempt to keep the "diplomatic process alive." [Ref.
47: p. 698]
Still hoping for a major breakthrough before the
"year of decision" came to a close, Sadat unenthusiasti-
cally accepted Rogers's invitation. Furthermore, he told
Donald Bergus that his emissary, Minister of State Murad
Ghaleb, would be given a "broad mandate." According to
Bergus, this would enable the U.S. to make "an intensive
effort to reach a solution by the end of the year." [Ref.
36: pp. 44, 47] Sadat was still skeptical when Bergus
informed him that Sisco would be an active participant in
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the talks, not just "a passive mailman." Sadat described
this new promise of American activity as "a rather thin
reed." [Ref. 36: pp. 44, 47] Despite his doubts,
Sadat indicated that he would participate in the U.S.
sponsored talks. He probably realized that they represen-
ted his best hope of achieving even a modicum of success
before the end of the year.
On the other hand, the Israelis refused to partici-
pate in the proximity talks unless the Nixon Administration
agreed to resume the supply of Phantom jets to Israel which
had ended during the 'past summer. The New York Times re-
ported that, without additional modern aircraft, such as
the F-4, Israeli officials were convinced that "the country
would be at a severe psychological and political disadvan-
tage as it went into negotiations with Egypt, which... is
assured of constant supplies of Soviet war materiel."
[Ref. 46: p. 8] Furthermore, the Israelis were reportedly
reluctant to enter into the indirect negotiations until
the United States clearly indicated what its role would
be. Unlike Sadat, the Israelis preferred Sisco to take
up the role of an impartial mediator who would not advance
his own ideas. [Ref. 46: p. 8]
5 . The November 1 Memorandum of Understanding
In an attempt to encourage Israel to join the proxi-
mity talks, the Nixon Administration subscribed on November
1 to a memorandum of understanding with Israel which would
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permit the Israelis to acquire a greater degree of self-
sufficiency in the manufacture of major weapons systems.
The New York Times reported that the memorandum included
provisions whereby "the United States agreed to provide
technical and manufacturing assistance" and the procedures
for the handling of future Israeli arms requests were
"streamlined." [Ref. 48: p. 1] Some officials at the
State Department and Pentagon argued that the memorandum
represented a loss of American diplomatic leverage over
Israel. Other officials argued that this leverage had never
been effective and that American influence in Israel could
be increased by friendlier ties between the two countries.
[Ref. 48: p. 7] Putting the debate aside, it is clear that
American policy makers, especially at the White House, did
in fact make a major concession in Israel's favor and
received nothing in return. After the signing of the
memorandum of understanding, Israel still refused to
agree to the proximity talks. By late 1971, it was clearly
apparent that the tail was in fact wagging the dog. Israel
could name its price and the U.S. would have to meet it
in order to obtain Israel's participation in the talks.
6 . Mrs. Meir Visits Washington
Throughout November, the United States was still
attempting to obtain Israel's participation in the proximity
talks wihtout agreeing to a new major arms package. Most
American officials believed that the military situation
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between Egypt and Israel was unquestionably in Israel's
favor. During an interview in mid-November, Secretary
Rogers reflected this view and added that Israel's position
had been enhanced by Soviet moderation in recent shipments
to Egypt. Rogers stated:
Up to now the military balance has not shifted....
President Nixon has made it quite clear that he's going
to be sure that the military balance is continued. And
I think Israeli spokesmen have indicated in the last
three or four months that they do recognize that the U.S.
has done a great deal for them over the months and years.
Now, the Soviet Union in the last four or five months
has operated with some restraint as far as shipments are
concerned ....
In the last four months ,.. .their shipments have been
very moderate. [Ref. 49: p. 34]
In early December, Prime Minister Meir arrived in
Washington for discussions with top U.S. officials on the
subjects of Israel's participation in the proximity talks
and a new U.S. -Israeli arms agreement. Preeminent in
Mrs. Meir's mind was her desire to strike a deal for more
F-4 Phantom aircraft. Not merely satisfied with a single
agreement covering F-4's, Mrs. Meir sought, according to
Quandt , a long-term arms agreement. Mrs. Meir pointed out
that such an agreement would serve the following purposes:
it would convince the Soviet Union and Egypt that they
cannot drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel; it
would show them that a military solution to the Middle East
conflict was impossible; and, most important, it would
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prevent "periodic squabbles" between the U.S. and Israel
over future arms requests. [Ref. 2: pp. 146-47]
Ignoring Rogers's view of the military situation in
the Middle East, Nixon agreed, according to Quandt , to
a new Israeli arms deal which included the delivery of
F-4's. However, Nixon refused to agree to Mrs. Meir's
proposal of a long-term arms agreement because of the nega-
tive impact that such an agreement would have on American-
Arab relations. [Ref. 2: pp. 146-47] Encouraged,
but far from completely satisfied, Mrs. Meir made the
following comment at a news conference prior to her departure:
Some of the misunderstandings have been cleared away....
I went away (from the meeting with Nixon) with the
feeling that there is definitely an understanding of
the problems in our area and the Israeli way of looking
at them. I guess that's the most one can ask of a
friendly government. [Ref. 50]
Neither Mrs. Meir nor American officials would announce
publicly Nixon's decision to sell more Phantoms to Israel.
Administration officials feared that an announcement of the
sale would prompt Egypt to abandon the proximity talks.
Incredibly, despite the new arms deal, Mrs. Meir still
withheld her agreement to join the talks.
7. Sadat's January 13, 1972 Speech
In a nationally broadcast speech on January 13,
Sadat explained to the Egyptian people why the "year of
decision" had passed quietly without decisive action
taken toward either war or peace. Sadat stated that the
Indo-Pakistani war of the previous month caused him to
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cancel his plans to attack Israel set for the same period.
With treaty commitments to India, Sadat explained, the
Soviet Union was preoccupied with the conflict on the
Indian subcontinent and was thus unable to lend its full
support to Egypt. [Ref. 51: p. 1]
Turning quickly to the United States, Sadat con-
demned the Nixon Administration over unconfirmed reports
that it had sold additional Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel
Furthermore, he called the U.S. Israel's "mentor" and accused
it of supporting Israel's ambition to control Arab land
"from the Nile to the Euphrates." Finally, he criticized
American diplomatic efforts to achieve an interim Suez
Canal agreement by referring to them as a game of "hide-
and-seek." [Ref. 51: p. 1]
Sadat indicated that he trusted the capabilities
of Ambassador Jarring and was prepared for further contacts
with him. He made it clear that any solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict must be based squarely on two principles:
"No surrender of one inch of Arab land. No bargain on the
rights of the Palestinians." [Ref. 51: p. 6]
8 . Israel Consents to the Proximity Talks
As reported by The New York Times , during most of
January, Sisco met with Israel's Ambassador to the U.S.
Yitzhak Rabin to resolve the remaining issues which pre-
vented Israel from joining the proximity talks. The Sisco-
Rabin discussions focussed on the details of the U.S. -Israeli
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arms agreement of December 2 and on the role the U.S.
intended to play in the talks. Concerning the American role,
the two sides agreed that the U.S. would promote agreement
between Israel and Egypt but would not put forward its
own positions. Furthermore, the United States promised
that it would hold "very thorough discussions" with Israel
prior to making a proposal to break any eventual deadlock.
[Ref. 52: p. 14]
Regarding the details of the December arms agree-
ment, The New York Times reported that the U.S. agreed to
sell Israel 42 F-4 Phantoms and 90 A-4 Skyhawks . Further-
more, delivery of the aircraft would begin immediately.
[Ref. 53: p. 1] According to Quandt , the various points
of agreement between the U.S. and Israel on the arms
package and on the U.S. role in the proximity talks culmin-
ated in another memorandum of understanding which was
signed en February 2. [Ref. 2: p. 147] That same day,
the Israeli Cabinet decided to accept the proximity talks,
three months after they were proposed by Secretary Rogers.
[Ref. 53: p. 1]
9 . Egypt Rejects the Proximity Talks
Judging from the harsh public, comments made by
Sadat in late 1971 and early 1972,* it was plain to see that
*In an interview by Newsweek ' s de Borchgrave in early De-
cember 1971, Sadat stated: "When I visited my troops last
week, I said quite frankly that I had lost confidence in the
U.S. We are now back to square one." [Ref. 36: p. 47] In
an interview by C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times on
100

the Egyptian President had lost all confidence in the ability
of the United States to work seriously for an interim agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel. He was convinced that the
United States was firmly in agreement with Israel's posi-
tion concerning an interim settlement and would therefore
be unwilling and unable to negotiate impartially. Sadat's
view of the relationship between the United States and
Israel was validated when it was made public on February
5 that the U.S. had agreed to sell Israel 42 Phantoms and
90 Skyhawks. [Ref. 53: p. 1]
Outraged by the American decision to provide Israel
with more sophisticated aircraft, Sadat declared that Egypt
December 10, Sadat made the following comments concerning
U.S. diplomacy:
In the last eight months we have had contacts with
the United States and my conclusion is this: I and your
State Department and your Administration were playing
hide-and-seek. They told me in the first place, please
put confidence in us . I said very well, I am quite
ready to put confidence in you.
Ultimately, we started. I took my initiative .. .upon
the fourth of February, and they said very well this is
a marvelous thing, we shall be working on it and so on.
Then it ended. . .
.
The U.S. wants Israel to use the occupation of my
land and Arab land as an instrument of pressure to
impose all that she wants. It ended like this. I am
awfully sorry to say that I lost confidence completely
in your Administration. [Ref. 54]
In his national speech of January 13, Sadat referred to the
United States as the "mentor" of Israel and accused the
U.S. again of playing diplomatic "hide-and-seek" throughout
1971. [Ref. 51: p. 6]
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would not participate in the proximity talks under the
current circumstances
. In an interview in late February by
Newsweek ' s de Borchgrave , Sadat called the American sponsored
talks "a dead horse" and emphasized that "an American solu-
tion is clearly unacceptable to us." He did indicate, how-
ever, that he would be willing to resume negotiations under
Ambassador Jarring' s auspices. [Ref. 55: pp. 42, 47]
Enraged with bitterness, Sadat made the following verbal
attack against the U.S. during this same interview:
I simply cannot understand why--despite the fact
that your government said only a few weeks before*
that the balance of power was overwhelmingly in
Israel's favor--you went ahead and suddenly increased
Israel's air force by one-third. It is this escala-
tion that wrecked the political solut ion . . . .The U.S.
has now swung all its weight behind Israel. You are
trying to compensate for your setback on the (Indian)
subcontinent ... .America has become a hopeless case,
especially in an election year with so many candidates
dependent as thev are on Jewish financing. [Ref. 55:
p. 47]
With those vitriolic words, the proposals for an
interim Suez Canal agreement and proximity talks were offi-
cially pronounced dead. Furthermore, a visit by Jarring to
Cairo, Amman, and Jerusalem in late February failed to
raise enough interest, especially among the Israelis, to
justify reactivating his mission, essentially defunct since
the previous February. [Ref. 55: p. 47] The conflict
between Egypt and Israel now entered into a period of
*See Rogers interview by USN&WP which was cited on page 97
[Ref. 49: p. 34]
102

diplomatic stalemate which would persist for nineteen
months until shattered by Sadat's bold strike across the
Suez Canal.
C. THE AFTERMATH OF THE "YEAR OF DECISION"
1
. Egyptian Frustration and Israeli Intransigence
In early 1972, the prevailing mood of the Egyptian
leadership was characterized by frustration and humiliation.
Sadat had taken unprecedented steps during the course of
the previous year to improve his image in the eyes of the
United States. He had hoped that the U.S. would fully
appreciate the significance of his interim-agreement pro-
posal and would, in the words of Dr. Malcolm Kerr, "decide
to lay down the law xo Israel." [Ref. 56: p. 20] His
hopes were exploded, however, when the United States made
several political and military agreements with Israel in
December and January. The agreements, which culminated in
the February 2 memorandum of understanding, indicated to
Sadat that the American and Israeli positions on the interim-
settlement were nearly identical and that the U.S. had
absolutely no intention of exerting pressure on Israel to
make concessions.
With little to expect from the United States, Sadat
visited Moscow on February 1 and 2 with the ostensible goal
of obtaining more Soviet military equipment as a counter-
balance to the then unconfirmed sale of more American
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Phantoms to the Israelis. In their joint communique, the
Soviet and Egyptian leaders stated that they had "considered
measures" for "further strengthening" of Egypt's military
capabilities in light of the growing military strength of
Israel. Thus, feeling deceived and humiliated by the
Americans, Sadat turned to the Soviets who had supported
the Egyptians during their "black days" of 1967 and imme-
diately afterwards. Furthermore, Sadat hoped that the
Soviets would make a strong statement on behalf of the
Arab cause during the Nixon-Breznev summit meeting sche-
duled for May in Moscow.
In Febraury 1972, U.S. -Israeli relations were
stronger than ever. The Febraury 2 memorandum of under-
standing more than made up for the brief deterioration of
relations stemming from Rogers's Suez Canal initiative,
his October 4 U.N. speech, and the protracted discussions
surrounding a new Phantoms deal. As a result of its
renewed feelings of confidence and security, Israel became
extremely intransigent and obstinate in its dealings with
the United States and in its policies concerning a
Middle East settlement. Although vitally dependent upon
the United States for diplomatic and military support, it
appeared by this time that Israel could influence the poli-
cies of its powerful friend at will. Gil Carl AlRoy comments
on this unique phenomenon:
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By 1971 ,... students of international relations were for
the first time contemplating seriously a substantial
Israeli capacity to ignore dictation from the United
States. They spoke of a new era in international poli-
tics, in which clients manipulated patrons, rather than
the other way around .... [Re f . 57: p. 95]
2
. U.S. Middle East Policy: A Stalemate Achieved
Kissinger's goal of a diplomatic stalemate was
achieved with the collapse of the proximity talks proposal.
Kissinger would now wait for the Egyptians to come to the
realization that their Soviet supporters could not recover
their territory for them. As soon as this happened and the
Soviets were removed from Egypt , then he would go to work
on the problems of the Middle East . Kissinger was in no
hurry because he believed that he had plenty of time.
The stalemate suited Nixon also. With no new
Middle East peace initiatives to worry about for a while,
he could rest on his other foreign policy triumphs while
concentrating on his reelection. The problems of the




In the twenty months between February 1972 and October
1973, the world witnessed negligible progress toward a
settlement in either the Israeli-Egyptian dispute or in
the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. While the United States
and Israel were content to keep the situation along the
Suez Canal static, Sadat carefully and painstakingly
charted his course for the eventual armed showdown with
Israel
.
In July 1972, Sadat shocked Israel, the United States,
and most of the world when he ordered the Soviet military
personnel out of h-is country. He felt betrayed by Soviet
statements at the recent U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit that seemed
to indicate that the Soviets favored along with the U.S.
a freeze in the situation in the Middle East. Furthermore,
he could no longer tolerate the incessant delays in the
shipment of promised Soviet military equipment. Perhaps
the most important reason for Sadat's sudden dismissal of
the Soviets was the enhanced military and diplomatic freedom
that such a move would give Egypt. Sadat apparently realized
that the Soviet presence precluded the full diplomatic
involvement of the United States and served as a brake on
his military options with regard to Israel.
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The United States was caught completely off guard by
this momentous event. The White House promised only
that it would undertake a diplomatic initiative, but not
until after the November election.
Disappointed by the tepid reaction of the United States
and convinced that the superpowers had assigned a very low
priority to the problems of the Middle East, Sadat made
his decision to attack Israel in the fall of 1972.
Throughout the next year, he thoroughly prepared himself
for the impending struggle. He lined up his supporters,
such as Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, the wealthy Arab
oil producers, and the nations of black Africa, and patched
up his differences with other Arab leaders, such as King
Hussein of Jordan. Furthermore, Sadat crafted his rhetoric
so carefully that his adversaries were completely deceived
as to his real intentions. By repeatedly threatening to
initiate hostilities, Sadat purposely "cried wolf" enough
so that Israel and the United States would not take his
threats seriously. Besides, the United States believed that
Sadat could not seriously challenge Israel's overwhelming
superiority and that any Egyptian attack would result in
another rout at the hands of the Israelis.
Meanwhile, during the first half of 1973, talks between
Kissinger and Sadat's National Security Adviser, Hafez Is-
mail, generated little hope for a settlement. Ismail
put forward an inflexible Egyptian program which called for
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a comprehensive settlement before the end of the year, a
prior Israeli agreement to withdraw to its 1967 borders, and
a resolution of the Palestinian question. Whereas Kissinger
had hoped that a meaningful dialogue could be established
between the U.S. and Egypt, Ismail merely echoed the un-
compromising attitude emanating from Cairo. Unbeknownst
to the Americans, the time for compromise had long since
passed.
In August 1973, Kissinger was named to succeed William
P. Rogers as Secretary of State. His appointment brought
little change and few surprises to the diplomatic situation
in the Middle East. In the last week of September, less
than two weeks before the outbreak of war in the Middle
East, Kissinger met with Arab and Israeli representatives
at the U.N. in an earnest attempt to establish his creden-
tials as an honest and trustworthy mediator who promised
to represent the interests of both sides fairly. He
suggested that the local parties participate in proximity
talks under American auspices starting in November. This
proposal, which in effect resurrected Rogers's idea of two
years earlier, convinced Sadat that no bold initiative would
be forthcoming from the United States. Kissinger's
uninspiring program served to vindicate Sadat's decision
to attack Israel. By such an act, Sadat hoped to shatter
the diplomatic stalemate and destroy the twin myths of




In his first news conference as President , Richard
M. Nixon referred to the situation in the Middle East as
a "powder keg" that could explode at any given moment.
Little did he realize at that time, however, that his own
policies toward and perception of the region over the next
four and a half years would help ignite the ever explosive
forces of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Throughout the three year period that separated the
Jordanian civil war and the October 1973 war, American
diplomacy toward the Middle East was largely influenced
by a number of attitudes and perceptions that were forged
in the apparent victory of American policies and actions
during the Jordanian crisis. Nixon and Kissinger emerged
from the episode with a firm belief that a strong and
secure Israel would protect American interests in the
Middle East, would deter an Arab attack, and would curb
and perhaps even reduce Soviet influence in the region.
The White House seemingly equated the maintenance of the
status quo between Israel and the Arabs— and the resulting
absence of hostilit ies--with some measure of peace and
stability in this vitally strategic region. By increasing
arms shipments to Israel and promising it diplomatic support,
the United States chose a course of action that disregarded
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crucial political developments in the Arab world, alienated
the leaders of both the radical and moderate Arab blocs
,
and encouraged closer political and military ties between
the Arabs and the Soviet Union.
Committed to the maintenance of the status quo, the
White House was content to pursue a very limited role in
the search for a Middle East peace settlement during the
period under examination in this thesis. The State Depart-
ment, under the leadership of William P. Rogers, explored
without success the possibility of achieving an interim
agreement between Egypt and Israel that would have resulted
in the reopening of the Suez Canal. Rogers's efforts were
seriously hampered by a narrow mandate from President
Nixon who preferred not to get involved in a laborious
negotiating process and refused to consider the idea of
pressuring Israel to make concessions.
A strong assertive U.S. Middle East policy, conducted
through secret negotiations, might have succeeded in
softening the extreme positions held by Egypt and Israel
and in bringing the two sides together in an interim agree-
ment. Furthermore, along the way to an agreement, American
negotiators might have struck a deal with Sadat to reduce
the number of Soviet military personnel in Egypt in return
for an American pledge to commit its political influence and
diplomatic resources to the search for an interim agreement
between Egypt and Israel. However, with U.S. -Israeli
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relations at their closest point in history and with the
Nixon Administration fearing a closer relationship between
Sadat and the Soviets, there was virtually no chance that
the United States would embark on a serious diplomatic ini-
tiative that would eventually require Israel to make con-
cessions that under the existing circumstances would
clearly appear as victories for the Soviets and their
radical Arab clients. On the other hand, a more perceptive
appreciation of Sadat's true feelings regarding peace with
Israel and relations with the Soviet Union might have
convinced American policy makers, especially at the White
House, that a high level peace initiative was well worth
the effort
.
The most important factor behind the failure of U.S.
Middle East policy during the period September 1970 to
February 1972 was the incredibly low priority assigned to
the problems of the region by Nixon and Kissinger. Pre-
occupied with Vietnam, detente, and China, the White House
relegated the daily management of Middle East affairs to the
State Department but retained the veto over all policy
decisions concerning the area. Nixon frequently stressed
the need for serious negotiations between the local parties
but offered very little support and encouragement when Rogers
and Sisco attempted to mediate the differences between Egypt
and Israel. Following the collapse of the Rogers initiative
in September 1971, Nixon directed Kissinger to assume
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operational control of Middle East policy and halt all fur-
ther American initiatives until after the November 1972
election. Ironically, at this critical juncture, Kissinger
designed a Middle East strategy that called for an interim
settlement between Egypt and Israel. Such an agreement,
he believed, would serve two purposes: it would spur the
local parties toward a comprehensive settlement and would
hasten the departure of the Soviets from Egypt. Unfor-
tunately, Kissinger's plan was as untimely as it was unin-
spired. It came too late to buttress Rogers and would not
be pursued until after Sadat's decision to go to war.
Nixon's renunciation of the central position in the
formulation and conduct of U.S. Middle East policy in the
years immediately preceding the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
war is integral to the understanding of the causes of that
event. A top level initiative, coordinated from the White
House and drawing upon the finest talents of the Executive
Branch, could have taken full advantage of the unique
regional developments of late 1970 and early 1971 and
achieved a major diplomatic breakthrough in the Israeli-
Egyptian dispute, thus preventing the 1973 war. It must
be emphasized that, during the past decade and a half, the
major achievements* of American foreign policy have been
*Such accomplishments include the Vietnam cease-fire,
detente with the Soviets, the SALT agreements, the Arab-
Israeli disengagement agreements, normalization with China,
the Camp David accords, and the Panama Canal treaty.
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characterized by the total commitment and dedicated
involvement of both the President of the United States
and a nucleus of talented assistants, who shared his
earnest desire to achieve the preferred policy outcome.
Unfortunately, William P. Rogers neither enjoyed the full
support of the President nor was regarded as a member of
the latter's inner circle.
In his critical account of Kissinger's tenure as Nixon's
national security advisor, The Price of Power
,
journalist
Seymour M. Hersh contends that between 1969 and 1972 Nixon
and Kissinger consistently sabotaged Rogers's chances of
negotiating first a comprehensive settlement then later
an. interim agreement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. [Ref.
58: p. 217] Hersh cites the following three examples
of efforts by the White House to undermine the effective-
ness of Rogers and the State Department. First, Nixon
revealed in his memoirs that he approved the Rogers Plan
of December 1969 only because it "had absolutely no chance
of being accepted by Israel" and "could never be implemented."
[Ref. 58: pp. 220-21 and Ref. 59: pp. 592-93] Second,
in May 1971 Kissinger warned Nixon that a reopened Suez
Canal would significantly aid the Soviet naval build up in
the Indian Ocean. [Ref. 58: p. 407] With this warning,
Kissinger was in effect offerring a strategic argument
against any initiative that proposed the clearing and
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reopening of the Suez Canal. Finally, in wake of the
Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, Kissinger ignored "a
steady stream of reports in 1971" from American diplomats
in Cairo that would have challenged his views that the
Soviets enjoyed a secure position in Egypt and that Sadat
was a dedicated pro-Communist. [Ref. 58: p. 408]
According to Hersh, Kissinger was determined to wrest
control of Middle East diplomacy from Rogers and to force
a showdown with the Soviets in the Middle East. [Ref. 58:
pp. 226-27] On this latter issue, Hersh is in complete
agreement with Quandt . Hersh argues that Kissinger was far
more concerned with discrediting the Soviets in the eyes of
their Arab clients and thus sharply reducing their influence
in the region than with working toward a settlement between
the local parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute. [Ref. 58:
p. 232]
Despite the special significance that Kissinger placed
on the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East , especially
Egypt , Hersh contends that the personal enmity between
Nixon's national security advisor and Rogers was the single
most important factor that prevented the former from joining
the search for a diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East.
Hersh quotes from one of Kissinger's former NSC aides
on this bureaucratic conflict and its tragic consequences:
I have a hard time believing that the balance (between
the White House and the State Department) wasn't tilted
by personal feelings . . . . It ' s such an unflattering thing
to say, but I think there was a lot of not wanting State
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to do it— rationalized, to be sure, by Henry. If Henry
would have had a shot at it, he might have attempted it.
It was the one genuine missed opportunity in that period.
It was a step that would have prevented the '73 war from
taking place. [Ref. 58: p. 407]
Writing of the period 1969-1972 in his memoirs, White
House Years
,
Kissinger consistently and steadfastly de-
fended the patient, noncommittal, and, at times, drifting
White House policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In-
late 1969, with the "war of attrition" intensifying,
Kissinger reflects on his evolving Middle East strategy:
But through this turmoil the inherent strength of
the American position in the Middle East also gradually
emerged. Nobody could make peace without us. Only we,
not the Soviet Union, could exert influence on Israel.
Israel was too strong to succumb to Arab military
pressure, and we could block all diplomatic activity
until the Arabs showed their (sic) willingness to
reciprocate Israeli concessions. If we remained steady
and refused to be stampeded, the pivotal nature of our
position would become more and more evident. Nixon
equivocated, believing in my strategy but authorizing
(and then aborting) State's tactics. In the process,
partly by default, we began to follow my preferred course.
The bureaucratic stalemate achieved what I favored as a
matter of policy: an inconclusive course that over time
was bound to induce at least some Arab leaders to recon-
sider the utility of relying on Soviet arms and radical
posturing to achieve their ends. Once it became clear—
for whatever reason--that a settlement could not be
extorted from us, Arab leaders would gradually learn
that Soviet pressures on us and their own intransigence
only produced stagnation. They would, I thought, have
to come to us in the end. [Ref. 5: pp. 378-79]
Writing on the events of early 1970, Kissinger comments on
the hoped for impact of this strategy on the moderate Arabs:
We should not yield to (radical Arab) blackmail; we
should not be panicked by radical rhetoric; patience could
be our weapon. By the same token, once the breakthrough
had occurred and the moderate Arabs had turned to us,
we had to move decisively to produce diplomatic results.
[Ref. 5: p. 559]
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Finally, following the collapse of the proximity talks
initiative in March 1972, Kissinger still stood by his
Middle East strategy. He writes:
My strategy had not changed. Until some Arab state
showed a willingness to separate from the Soviets, or
the Soviets were prepared to dissociate from the
maximum Arab program, we had no reason to modify
our policy. [Ref. 5: p. 1291]
Unfortunately, the White House did not "move decisively
to produce diplomatic results" after Sadat ordered the
Soviets out of his country in July 1972. As was shown
earlier, the restrained American diplomatic efforts of
late 1972 and 1973 increased Arab frustrations and encouraged
Sadat to launch his attack against Israel. Kissinger's
Middle East strategy eventually produced the reversal of
alliances that he had long hoped for. However, as he
states in his memoirs, "it took a long time, further crises,
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U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2 42*
(Passed Unanimously, November 22, 1967)
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situa-
tion in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of. the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting
peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have under-
taken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of
the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East which should include the application of
both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every
State in the area and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or
acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through inter-
national waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
*From Magnus, R. H. , ed., Documents on the Middle East
,
American Enterprise Institute, 1969, pp. 205-06.
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(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability
and political independence of every State in the area,
through measures including the establishment of demili-
tarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a
Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East
to establish and maintain contacts with the States con-
cerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts
to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance
with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the




THE ROGERS PLAN OF DECEMBER 9, 1969*
Secretary Rogers outlined the new U.S. peace proposal
during a Washington speech on December 9, 1969. According
to the Beirut daily An-Nahar
,
the Rogers Plan contained the
following ten points:
1. The UAR and Israel would agree on a timetable
for withdrawal of Israeli forces from UAR territory
occupied during the war.
2. The state of war between the UAR and Israel would
end officially, and both sides would abstain from any
activity that would be inconsistent with the state of
peace between them. This would involve refraining
from any acts of aggression and insuring that such
acts by private organizations would not be carried out
from their territory. The two sides would refrain from
interfering in the internal affairs of the other and
would agree that their mutual relationship would be
governed by provisions 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the UN
Charter
.
3. Both sides would agree to establishing secure
and recognized borders specified on maps, which would
become part of the final agreement. The agreement would
also include establishment of demilitarized zones and taking
effective measures in the Sharm el-Sheikh area xo guaran-
tee freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Within
this framework secure borders would be established at the
international frontier that existed between Egypt and
Palestine at the time of the British mandate.
4. The two sides through 'Rhodes-type' indirect
talks would formulate agreement on areas to be demili-
tarized, measures to guarantee freedom of passage through
the Tiran Straits, and effective security measures and a
final settlement in the Gaza Strip.
*From Arab Report and Record , issue no. 23, 1-15 Decem-
ber 1969, pp. 521-22.
123

5. The two sides would agree that the Straits of
Tiran are an international waterway, and the principle
of free navigation would apply to all states, including
Israel
.
6. In exercising sovereignty over the Suez Canal,
the UAR would emphasize the right of ships of all
nations, including Israel, to pass freely through the
canal without discrimination or interference.
7. The two sides would agree to submit to conditions
for a fair settlement to the refugee problem 'similar to
the final agreement between Jordan and Israel'.
8. The UAR and Israel would agree to recognize each
other's sovereignty, political independence and the
right to live in peace within secure boundaries.
9. The final agreement would be included in a
document signed by the two sides and filed with the UN,
the agreement going into effect once the document had
been deposited with the Secretary-General. The final
agreement would provide that any major violation of
the agreement by either side would give the other the
right to suspend implementation of the agreement either
partially or totally, until the violation had been ended.
10. The two sides would agree to submit the final
agreement to the UN Security Council for ratification.
The USA, the USSR, Britain and France would promise to
exercise their efforts to help the two sides adhere to




JARRING 1 S LETTER OF FEBRUARY 8, 1971*
(Delivered Simultaneously to Egypt and Israel)
I have been following with a mixture of restrained op-
timism and growing concern the resumed discussion under
my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settle-
ment of the Middle East question.
My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my
view the parties are seriously defining their positions
and wish to move forward to a permanent peace.
My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly
insists that the other make certain commitments before
being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the
provisions to be included in final peace agreement. There
is— as I see it--a serious risk that we shall find ourselves
in the same deadlock as existed during the first three years
of my mission.
I, therefore, feel that I should at this stage make
clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps
to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles
of Security Council Resolution W242/67, which the parties
have agreed to carry out in all its parts.
I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility
to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing
views (of) Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the
priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which
seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility--
is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simul-
taneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites
of an eventual peace settlement between them.
It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to
formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not
only for those topics covered by the commitments but with
*From Arab Report and Record , issue no. 5, 1-15
March 1971, p. 158.
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equal priority for other topics and in particular the
refugee question.
Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of
Israel and the U.A.R. to make to me at this stage the
following prior commitments simultaneously and on condi-
tion that the other party makes its commitments, and subject
to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other
aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular
a just settlement of the refugee problem:
Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces
from occupied U.A.R. territory to the former international
boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine
on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are
made for:
a. Establishing demilitarized zones.
b. Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el
Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of naviation through
the Straits of Tiran; and
c. Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.
#
The U.A.R. would give a commitment to enter into a peace
agreement with Israel and to make explicit therein to
Israel—on a reciprocal basis—undertakings and acknowledge-
ments covering the following subjects:
a. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
b. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
independence
;
c. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other right
to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
d. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure
that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate
from or are not committed from within the respective
territories against the population, citizens or property
of the other party; and
e. Non-interference in eachother's domestic affairs.
In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am con-
scious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commit'
ments but I am convinced that the present situation requires




EGYPT'S RESPONSE TO JARRING' S LETTER*
(Submitted February 15, 1971)
The U.A.R. has informed your Excellency that it accepts
to carry out on a reciprocal basis all its obligations as
provided for in Security Council Resolution 242/1967 with
a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East .
On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its
obligations contained in this resolution. Referring to
your aide-memoire of February, 1971, the U.A.R. would
give a commitment covering the following:
1. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure
that acts committed from within the respective territories
against the population, citizens or property of the other
party; and
5. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.
The U.A.R. would also give a commitment that:
6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez
Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention;
7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the
Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of inter-
national law;
8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations peace-
keeping force in Sharm el-Sheikh.




To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial
inviolability of every state in the area, the U.A.R. would
accept
:
a. The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the
borders in equal distances; and
b. The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping
force in which the four permanent members of the Security
Council would participate.
Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement
all the provisions of the Security Council's Resolution 242
of 1967. Israel should give a commitment covering the
following:
1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the
Gaza strip;
2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugees'
problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions;
3. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's
right to live in peace within secure and recognized boun-
daries
;
6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure
that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate
from or are committed from within the respective territories
against the population, citizens or property of the other
party;
7. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.
To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial
inviolability of every state in the area, Israel would accept:
a. The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the
borders in equal distances; and
b. The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping
force in which the four permanent members of the Security
Council would participate.
When Israel gives the commitments, the U.A.R. will be
ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing
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all the aforementioned obligationas as provided for in
Security Council Resolution 242.
The U.A.R. considers that just and lasting peace cannot
be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation
of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and the with-
drawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories




ISRAEL'S REPONSE TO JARRING 'S LETTER*
(Delivered February 26, 1971)
Israel views favourably the expression by the U.A.R. of
its readiness to enter into peace agreement with Israel
,
and
reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations
on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the
two countries.
The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace
agreement to be conducted between Israel and the U.A.R.
should inter alia include the provisions set out below.
A. Israel would give undertakings covering the
following:
1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict
between Israel and the U.A.R. as finally ended, and termina-
tion of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility
or belligerency between Israel and the U.A.R.;
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of the
U.A.R. ;
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of che right of the
U.A.R. to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries
;
4. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-
U.A.R. cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed
boundaries to be established in the peace agreement.
Israel wjll not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines;
5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both
parties in this connection, Israel is prepared to negotiate
with the governments directly involved on:
a. The payment of compensation for abandoned lands
and property; and




b. Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation
of the refugees in the region.
Once the obligations of the parties towards the settle-
ment of the refugee issue have been agreed neither party
shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with
its sovereignty;
6. The responsibility for ensuring that no warlike
act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or
individual originates from or is committed in the terri-
tory of Israel against the population, armed forces or
property of the U.A.R.;
7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the
U . A . R . ;
8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliance
against the U.A.R. and the prohibition of stationing of
troops of other parties which maintain a state of belli-
gerency against the U.A.R.
B. The U.A.R. undertakings in the peace agreement with
Israel would include:
1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict
between the U.A.R. and Israel as finally ended and termina-
tion of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility
or belligerency between the U.A.R. and Israel;
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of Israel;
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of
Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement.
4. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like
act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or
individual originates from or is committed in the terri-
tory of the U.A.R. against the population, armed forces or
property of Israel;
5. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel;
6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage
for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal;
7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifes-
tations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal
international relations of Israel; and
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8. Non-participation by the U.A.R. in hostile alliances
against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops
of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency
against Israel
.
The U.A.R. and Israel should enter into a peace agreement
with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in
accordance with normal international law and precedent , and
containing the above undertakings.
The Government of Israel believes that now that the
U.A.R. has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willing-
ness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel , and both
parties have presented their basic positions, they should
now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete
manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the
points listed in their respective documents with a view
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